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VI 
JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals dated April 26, 
2001. Jurisdiction of this Court is appropriate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(a) (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court of appeals err in ruling that the district court had 
jurisdiction over this action when Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (1990) expressly 
empowers district courts to declare an administrative rule invalid upon a finding that 
the rule violates statutory law, that the agency did not have legal authority to make the 
rule, or that the rule is not applicable to the aggrieved party? 
Standard of Review: 
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 1 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540 (citing 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) and Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co., v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 1 4, 978 P.2d 460). 
2. Did the court of appeals err in ruling that compliance with the exhaustion 
requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 would cause Plaintiffs and the 
class members irreparable harm under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 when the action 
is brought as a class action with a de minimis amount at stake for each individual 
taxpayer, when dismissal of Plaintiffs' action, due to the statute of limitations, might 
result in the loss to class members of much of the refund for illegal taxes paid, and 
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when the Tax Commission has threatened to subject each class member to a 
counterclaim or punitive hearing to determine whether any use taxes are owed by such 
class member - even without any factual basis to support such a claim? 
Standard of Review: 
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, f 8, 27 P.3d 538, 540 (citing 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) and Bear River Mut. 
Ins. Co., v. Wall 1999 UT 33, f 4, 978 P.2d 460). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § ll(3)(a): 
(3)(a) The State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the 
tax laws of the State. 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11(5): 
(5) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission 
in this Constitution, the Legislature may authorize any court established 
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any 
matter decided by the State Tax Commission or by a County Board of 
Equalization relating to revenue and taxation as provided by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 (1987): 
(1) An interested person may petition an agency requesting the 
making, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
(2) The division shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and the 
procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition. 
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(3) A statement shall accompany the proposed rule, or amendment or 
repeal of a rule, demonstrating that the proposed action is within the 
jurisdiction of the agency and appropriate to the powers of the agency. 
(4) Within 30 days after submission of a petition, the agency shall 
either deny the petition in a writing stating its reasons for the denial, or 
initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with Section 63-46a-4. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001): 
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the 
rule by filing a complaint with the county clerk in the district court where 
the person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County. 
(b) Any person aggrieved by an agency's failure to comply with 
Section 63-46a-3 may obtain judicial review of the agency's failure to 
comply by filing a complaint with the clerk of the district court where the 
person resides or in the district court in Salt Lake County. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person seeking judicial 
review under this section shall exhaust that person's administrative 
remedies by complying with the requirements of Section 63-46a-12 
before filing the complaint. 
(b) When seeking judicial review of a rule, the person need not 
exhaust that person's administrative remedies if: 
(i) less than six months has passed since the date that the rule 
became effective and the person had submitted verbal or written 
comments on the rule to the agency during the public comment 
period; 
(ii) a statute granting rulemaking authority expressly exempts 
rules made under authority of that statute from compliance with 
Section 63-46a-12; or 
(iii) compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would cause the person 
irreparable harm. 
(3) (a) In addition to the information required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a complaint filed under this section shall contain: 
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(i) the name and mailing address of the plaintiff; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the defendant agency; 
(iii) the name and mailing address of any other party joined in the 
action as a defendant; 
(iv) the text of the rule or proposed rule, if any; 
(v) an allegation that the person filing the complaint has either 
exhausted the administrative remedies by complying with Section 63-
46a-12 or met the requirements for waiver of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies established by Subsection (2)(b); 
(vi) the relief sought; and 
(vii) factual and legal allegations supporting the relief sought. 
(b) (i) The plaintiff shall serve a summons and a copy of the complaint as 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(ii) The defendants shall file a responsive pleading as required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(iii) The agency shall file the administrative record of the rule, if any, 
with its responsive pleading. 
(4) The district court may grant relief to the petitioner by: 
(a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that: 
(i) the rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does 
not have legal authority to make the rule; 
(ii) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole administrative record; or 
(iii) the agency did not follow proper rulemaking procedure; 
(b) declaring the rule nonapplicable to the petitioner; 
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(c) remanding the matter to the agency for compliance with proper 
rulemaking procedures or further fact-finding; 
(d) ordering the agency to comply with Section 63-46a-3; 
(e) issuing a judicial stay o injunction to enjoin the agency from illegal 
action or action that would cause irreparable harm to the petitioner or 
(f) any combination of Subsections (4) (a) through (e). 
(5) If the plaintiff meets the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), the district court 
may review and act on a complaint under this section whether or not the 
plaintiff has requested the agency review under Section 63-46a-12. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953): 
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted 
whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a 
court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application is deemed 
sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, 
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to 
show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(a) and (f) (1996): 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state. 
* * * 
(f) (i) admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums, 
planetariums, shows of any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts, 
carnivals, amusement parks, amusement rides, circuses, menageries, 
fairs, races, contests, sporting events, dances, boxing and wrestling 
matches, closed circuit television broadcasts, billiard or pool parlors, 
bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving ranges, batting 
cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile trails, 
tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides, river runs, jeep tours, boat 
tours, scenic cruises, horseback rides, sports activities, or any other 
amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic 
activity; 
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(ii) the tax imposed on admission or user fees in Subsection d)(f)(i) 
does not affect an entity's sales tax exempt status under Section 59-12-
104-1. 
Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-62 (1999) (Add. Ex. 3): 
A. Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons 
engaged in selling taxable commodities or services are taxable, 
and the tax shall be billed or collected on the selling price at the 
time the tickets, books, or cards are sold. Tax is to be added at 
the subsequent selection and delivery of the merchandise or 
services if an additional charge is made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This is a class action brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs and a class of 
persons and entities who have paid Utah sales tax on the cost of purchasing or 
renewing their annual membership in the Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco") 
and/or WalMart Stores, Inc. d/b/a Sam's Club ("Sam's Club"). The named Plaintiffs 
contend that the sales tax is not authorized by the Legislature and, thus, is an illegal 
tax improperly created and levied by the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax 
Commission"). 
The Tax Commission and its lawyers desperately seek to avoid judicial scrutiny 
of the Tax Commission's actions in creating and assessing this illegal tax. Not only do 
they contend that there is no district court authority to review the Tax Commission's 
authority in this regard, but they threaten a process that will ensure that taxpayers will 
not challenge their actions. As previously noted by this Court, however, "some form 
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of traditional appellate review is essential to ensure that the Tax Commission proper!} 
applies relevant law and does not act outside its jurisdiction.'' See Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, <j 20, 979 P.2d 
346. 
Under Utah law, the Legislature - not the Tax Commission - actually 
determines which transactions shall be taxed and then levies the actual sales tax on 
those transactions. In Section 59-12-103 of the Utah Code, the Legislature has 
actually levied sales tax on certain enumerated transactions.1 Once those sales taxes 
are levied, the Tax Commission then is given the constitutional authority to 
"administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." See Utah Const, art. XIII, § 
ll(3)(a). "[A]n administrative grant to administer a statute is not to be confused with 
a grant of discretion to interpret the statute." Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Com'n, 
1999 UT 26, 1f 3, n. 4, 976 P.2d 1197. 
In Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Com'n, the Court reviewed a rule of the Tax 
Commission assessing sales tax on charges made for guaranteed hotel 
accommodations. The Court reviewed the rule to determine whether it was "in 
harmony with 59-12-103(l)(i)" and, finding that it was not, the Court struck down the 
rule. Id. at 1 8. The Court instructed that taxation statutes shall be construed 
1
 Section 59-12-103(1) reads in pertinent part as follows: "(1) There is levied a tax on 
the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the following: . . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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narrowly, in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the Legislature - not to the Tax 
Commission - to clarify an intent to be more expansive. See id. at f 9. Any rule that 
extends the reach of a taxing statute "beyond what a narrow reading of the statutes 
would allow" is invalid. Id. at f 12. 
In this case, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Tax Commission acted outside 
the limited statutory authority granted to it by the Legislature when it imposed a sales 
tax on the annual membership fees paid by Costco and Sam's Club members. Each 
class member's claim in this action totals only approximately $2.50 per year, but the 
aggregate amount of the windfall to the Tax Commission already collected through its 
illegal tax is believed to be in excess of several million dollars, and that amount will 
continue to increase until the courts declare the tax illegal. 
The Tax Commission thus far has avoided judicial review of its illegal tax by 
seeking dismissal of the action on the grounds that there was not a proper basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court and that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies. The trial court granted the Tax Commission's motion to 
dismiss, ruling that it would be an unconstitutional infringement for the court to decide 
the case without allowing the Tax Commission to first address the claim, and, even if 
the court had constitutional authority to hear the matter, the case should be dismissed 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The court of appeals correctly reversed the trial court's grant of the motion to 
dismiss. The Legislature has granted district courts the power to declare an 
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administrate rule imalid or inapplicable to a petitioner. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46a-12.1 (2001). Nothing in Article XIII, Section 11, of the Constitution of Utah 
prevents a district court from exercising this power. Moreover, to allow a district 
court to declare invalid an illegal tax wrongfully imposed by the Tax Commission 
would not interfere with or infringe upon the Tax Commission's limited constitutional 
authority to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." See Utah Const, art. 
XIII, § ll(3)(a). Finally, Article XIII, Section 11(5), does not prohibit a district court 
from declaring invalid an illegal tax levied by the Tax Commission. See Utah Const. 
Art. XIII, § 11(5).2 Indeed, Section 11(5) was added recently to the Constitution to 
expand district court authority, expressly granting to the Legislature the power to 
authorize district courts to review any matter decided by the Tax Commission. That 
grant of power did not limit any authority district courts already had with respect to the 
Tax Commission. 
Under Section 63-46a-12.1, district courts are specifically empowered to 
declare an administrative rule invalid if the agency did not have the legal authority to 
make the rule. That power is entirely consistent with the Tax Commission's 
2
 Article XIII, Section 11(5) provides as follows: 
(5) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in 
this Constitution, the Legislature may authorize any court established 
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any 
matter decided by the State Tax Commission or by a County Board of 
Equalization relating to revenue and taxation as provided by statute. 
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constitutional power to administer and supervise the tax laws. The Tax Commission's 
pouer certainly does not extend to imposing or creating taxes that are not levied or 
authorized by the Legislature.3 Plaintiffs' action is simply one to have the district 
court declare that the Tax Commission has imposed an illegal tax. The trial court, 
therefore, had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' class action and should not have dismissed it 
on jurisdictional grounds. 
The court of appeals also correctly ruled that the requirement to exhaust 
administrative remedies need not be met inasmuch as compliance with that requirement 
would cause the Plaintiffs and class members irreparable harm under Section 63-46a-
12.1. The Tax Commission would have each of the tens of thousands of individual 
taxpayers who have paid the illegal sales tax file an independent petition with the Tax 
Commission and, if successful on the petition, follow the procedures to obtain a 
refund. In contrast to the burden of preparing and filing such a petition, the amount of 
the refund for each taxpayer would be only a few dollars. The reality, therefore, is 
that few, if any, such taxpayers would undertake the procedure and incur the burden 
and expense demanded by the Tax Commission. In the meantime, the Tax 
Commission would retain a windfall from an unauthorized sales tax, while none of the 
3
 " There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for the 
following: . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (1996). 
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purposes to be served b\ the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would 
be served by first requiring such a procedure before the Tax Commission. 
Moreover, to increase the futility of the procedure advocated by the Tax 
Commission, the Tax Commission has threatened, on the record in this action, to 
single out any Costco or Sam's Club member who attempts to pursue and exhaust their 
administrative remedies with a special punitive hearing or counterclaim (despite a total 
lack of any basis in fact) in which the Tax Commission will examine the member's 
financial records as far back as possible to establish that the member has not paid other 
unrelated taxes, such as sales tax in connection with catalog purchases.4 
As argued in greater detail below, exhaustion of administrative remedies should 
not be required under the circumstances of this case. First, the requirement does not 
apply when an agency's statutory authority is challenged. This is purely a question of 
law left to the courts. Secondly, as discussed above, requirement of exhaustion here 
would be useless and futile, would serve no useful purpose, and would result in 
irreparable harm, particularly if the Tax Commission is permitted to follow through 
with its threatened punitive actions. Indeed, a class action would serve to provide a 
feasible means for asserting the rights of those who would have no realistic remedy if a 
class action were not available. The reasonable, rational approach under the 
4
 At the hearing in the trial court on the motion to dismiss, the Tax Commission 
imperiously threatened to subject any taxpayer to a hearing or counterclaim. {See 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 20-21, R.258, Add. Ex. 2.) 
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circumstances in this case is to permit the class action to proceed, allowing the trial 
court to review the statutory authority for the challenged sales tax. 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the trial court 
had subject matter jurisdiction and that exhaustion of administrative remedies would 
serve no useful purpose and would cause Plaintiffs and the members of the Class 
irreparable harm, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
B. SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On September 30, 1999, the named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves 
individually and any and all persons and entities similarly situated, filed a declaratory 
judgment action, seeking an order and judgment that Section 59-12-103(1) does not 
authorize a sales tax on the purchase of annual Costco and Sam's Club memberships, 
and that the Tax Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it required Costco 
and Sam's Club to collect sales tax on the purchase of those memberships, seeking a 
refund of any and all such sales taxes that they paid during the class period, together 
with interest thereon at the statutory rate. 
The Tax Commission moved the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including the failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. Oral argument was heard on January 19, 2000. The trial court granted the 
Tax Commission's motion to dismiss through a Memorandum Decision dated February 
25, 2000, and signed by the trial court on February 28, 2000. (R. 234-39). 
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Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2000. On April 26, 2001. 
the court of appeal issued its decision reversing the trial court's order. 
On May 10, 2001, the Tax Commission filed its Petition for Rehearing to the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing on May 15, 
2001. 
The Tax Commission filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on June 12, 2001. 
The Court granted a Writ of Certiorari on August 15, 2001. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Costco and Sam's Club located in Utah both offer several different types 
of memberships, including individual memberships, memberships for couples, and 
group memberships available to businesses and other organizations. Once purchased, 
memberships must be renewed annually for a fee. (Complaint t l 9 and 10, R. 4, Add. 
Ex. 1.) 
2. At all times relevant to Plaintiffs' claim, which includes the entire time 
prior to the filing of this claim for which wrongfully assessed and collected taxes are 
recoverable by the person or entity paying those taxes ("the class period"), the Utah 
State Legislature, pursuant to the provisions of the Sales and Use Tax Act (codified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 et seq.), has imposed a sales tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for various transactions, including "retail sales of tangible 
personal property made within the state" and "admission or user fees" for enumerated 
types of "amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or athletic 
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acthity." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103< l)(a) and (f) (1996). (Complaint c c 11-
14, R. 4-5, Add. Ex. 1.) 
3. At all times during the class period, the Tax Commission has claimed 
that it has had, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210 and § 59-12-118, the statutory 
authority to promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of the Sales and Use 
Tax Act, and, relying on those statutes, has promulgated the "Sales and Use Tax 
Rules" (codified as Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-1 (1999) et seq.), including an 
administrative rule entitled "Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 59-12-102 and 59-12-103," numbered R. 865-19S-33 (1999) (Add. Ex. 4). 
(Complaint §§ 15 and 16, R. 5, Add. Ex. 1.) 
4. The Tax Commission has also promulgated an administrative rule entitled 
"Meal Tickets, Coupon Books, and Merchandise Cards Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-103," numbered R.865-19S-62 (1999), and which reads as follows: 
A. Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons 
engaged in selling taxable commodities or services are taxable, and the 
tax shall be billed or collected on the selling price at the time the tickets, 
books, or cards are sold. Tax is to be added at the subsequent selection 
and delivery of the merchandise or services if an additional charge is 
made. 
(Complaint f 17, R.7, Add. Ex. 1.) 
5. Purporting to act pursuant to these statutes and rules, the Tax 
Commission has decided that membership fees at Costco and Sam's Club are 
"admission" fees and/or the sale of "merchandise cards" and/or are "considered 
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taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or service provided." The Tax 
Commission has. therefore, ordered Costco and Sam's Club to collect the sales tax on 
the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships. (Complaint ™ 18-20, R. 7 
and 8, Add. Ex. 1.) 
6. Costco and Sam's Club have, in reliance upon the Tax Commission's 
claimed authority and its directives, imposed and collected the sales tax on the price of 
the purchase and renewal of memberships, and have remitted or intend to remit all 
such collected sales tax to the Tax Commission. The named Plaintiffs and each of the 
members of the class have paid the sales tax when they purchased new Costco and/or 
Sam's Club memberships and each time they purchased renewed memberships. 
(Complaint t t 21 and 22, R. 8, Add. Ex. 1.) 
7. Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that the Tax Commission's levy of a 
sales tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships exceeds the Tax Commission's 
authority because the memberships are not part of the sales price of merchandise 
purchased at Costco and/or Sam's Club. Membership fees have no relation to either 
the quantity or price of merchandise purchased at Costco or Sam's Club, and members 
are in no way required to purchase anything at Costco or Sam's Club. (Complaint t 
26, R. l l , Add. Ex. 1.) 
8. Plaintiffs further allege in their Complaint that even if Utah Admin. R. 
865-19S-62 is properly within the authority of the Commission and is otherwise 
enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships at Costco and Sam's Club because those 
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memberships are not a sale of "merchandise cards." While Sam's Club and Costco 
both issue membership cards to their members as evidence of membership, the 
membership cards are not sold. Membership cards are the property of Sam's Club or 
Costco, not the member. Membership cards are issued solely for Sam's Club and 
Costco's administrative purposes to evidence membership. There is no charge to 
replace a lost or stolen membership card. (Complaint 1 25, R. 10-11, Add. Ex. 1.) 
9. The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and each and every 
one of them, have been damaged by having to pay the wrongfully and unlawfully 
imposed and collected Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and/or each renewal of their 
Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. (Complaint f 27, R. 11, Add. Ex. 1.) 
10. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of this controversy. The members of the Plaintiff class number 
in the tens of thousands, and its membership is spread throughout the state of Utah, so 
that joinder of all members is impracticable. It would also be impractical for each 
member of the class to bring separate actions. The individual damages of any one 
class member will be relatively small when measured against the potential costs of 
bringing this action, making the expense and burden of this litigation not feasible for 
individual actions. In this class action, the trial court could determine the rights of the 
named Plaintiffs and all members of the class with judicial economy. (Complaint t 
33, R. 13, Add. Ex. 1.) 
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11. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment requesting the 
trial court to declare that the sales tax imposed by the Tax Commission on Costco and 
Sam's Club memberships are unlawful, have never been authorized by the Utah Sales 
and Use Tax Act, and are outside the authority of the Tax Commission to impose. 
Plaintiffs seek an order of the court requiring the Tax Commission to refund, together 
with interest, the wrongfully paid taxes. (Complaint ff 36 and 38, R. 16-17, Add. 
Ex. 1.) 
12. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against the Tax 
Commission, enjoining the Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club from 
assessing and collecting sales tax on the future sales and renewals of their 
memberships. (Complaint t 45, R. 19, Add. Ex. 1.) 
13. The Tax Commission has threatened to subject any taxpayer who seeks a 
refund of the tax paid on the annual memberships in question to a hearing or 
counterclaim to determine whether the taxpayer has failed to pay any use tax in the 
past. The Tax Commission contends it will then use that inquisition to offset any 
refund to which the taxpayer might be entitled as a result of paying sales tax on the 
taxpayer's membership. At the hearing before the district court on the Tax 
Commission's motion to dismiss, Assistant Attorney General Snelson commented on 
the procedure for each member of the class to request a refund as follows: 
[EJach of these individuals would have to come in and have some type of 
a hearing to establish the individual amounts that they're entitled to. The 
Tax Commission is entitled to offset, before refund, any other taxes 
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owed. It is my assertion and if this case moves forward it will be our 
counterclaim that the Tax Commission is entitled to a counterclaim against 
every claimant for any use tax that is not paid by them. Every time you 
buy something from Lands end or another catalog or over the internet, 
bring that into the State without paying the tax you're liable for the use 
tax on that. If they haven't paid that use tax we're entitled to an offset for 
any amounts that they've purchased and there, since there's no filing 
there's not statute of limitations. We can go back as far as we can obtain 
records to determine what those amounts are and we're entitled to that 
offset. 
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 20-21, R. 258, Add. Ex. 2.) Anyone 
opting to avail themselves of their right to a refund, therefore, will be singled out for 
this discriminatory treatment threatened by the Tax Commission, increasing the futility 
and irreparable harm resulting from the exhaustion requirement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly ruled that the district court had jurisdiction over 
the Plaintiffs' class action for a declaratory judgment that the Tax Commission did not 
have the legal authority to impose sales tax on Costco and Sam's Club annual 
memberships under the Sales and Use Tax Act, and that the requirement of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies under the Utah Rulemaking Act was satisfied in this case. 
With respect to jurisdiction, Section 63-46a-12.1 of the Utah Rulemaking Act 
expressly authorizes a district court to declare a rule invalid if the court finds that the 
rule violates statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority to make the 
rule. The Tax Commission's levy of the sales tax in question violates the Sales and 
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Use Tax Act, and the Tax Commission, therefore, exceeded its authority in levying 
such tax. 
The grant of authority in Section 63-46a-12.1 does not violate Article XIII, 
section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, which grants the Tax Commission the power to 
'"administer and supervise the tax laws of the State." Moreover, the amendment to 
Article XIII contained in section 11(5) - to the effect that the Legislature may 
authorize district courts to adjudicate any matter decided by the Tax Commission -
was a grant of jurisdiction intended to expand - not limit - the authority of district 
courts. The district court continues to have any and all other jurisdiction it had 
constitutionally, notwithstanding the amendment. 
In the event the district court ultimately determines that the sales tax in question 
is illegal, the district court has the power necessary to order the Tax Commission to 
refund to the taxpayer class members the amount of illegal tax paid, plus appropriate 
interest. The district court has implied powers as are necessary to carry into effect the 
judgment it has jurisdiction to enter. Moreover, the district court has statutory 
authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.) to 
grant such relief as is necessary or proper in connection with its declaratory judgment. 
The exercise of such authority would not interfere with the core prerogatives of the 
Tax Commission in administering and supervising the tax laws of Utah. 
With respect to exhaustion of administration remedies, the court of appeals 
correctly ruled that the exhaustion requirement of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
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Act was satisfied in this case. That act requires a person seeking judicial review to 
exliaust the administrative remedy set forth in section 63-46a-12 , but, under section 
63-46a-12.1, the person need not exhaust his administrative remedies if compliance 
with section 63-46a-12 would cause the person irreparable harm. 
Because this is a class action - and there is no provision for a class action 
proceeding under either the Sales and Use Tax Act or the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act - with a de minimis amount at stake for each individual taxpayer, 
taxpayers would have no realistic day in court if they were each required to exhaust 
their administrative remedies. Additionally, if this action is dismissed, the class 
members could forever lose the right to recover the illegal tax they paid during much 
of the class period of this case because of the three-year statute of limitations. Finally, 
the Tax Commission has threatened on the record in this case that any class member 
who undertakes to exhaust administrative remedies and seeks a refund of the 
challenged sales tax would be singled out and subjected to a counterclaim or a punitive 
hearing in connection with the refund process in this action. The court of appeals' 
conclusion that these circumstances constitute irreparable harm in the context of the 
exhaustion requirement is in line with the numerous pronouncements of this Court that 
"exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be necessary when it would serve no 
useful purpose." See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, \ 14 
(quoting State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989), and Johnson 
v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980)). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER 
PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION THAT THE TAX 
COMMISSION EXCEEDED ITS LEGAL AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING 
SALES TAX ON THE PURCHASE OF ANNUAL MEMBERSHIPS 
The court of appeals correctly held that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment class action challenging the Tax 
Commission's authority to impose sales tax on the purchase of annual memberships to 
Costco and Sam's Club, properly rejecting the Tax Commission's contention that it 
would be an unconstitutional infringement for the district court to hear the matter 
before the Tax Commission first decided it. 
1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-
12.1. 
Plaintiffs challenge the validity of certain administrative rules pursuant to which 
the Tax Commission has imposed the sales tax in question. The Legislature has 
expressly provided that a district court has the authority to review the legality of Tax 
Commission rules under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(l)(a) (2001), which states: 
"Any person aggrieved by a rule may obtain judicial review of the rule by filing a 
complaint with the county clerk in the district court where the person resides or in the 
district court in Salt Lake County." From a plain reading of the statute, such judicial 
review does not require a prior adjudicative proceeding by the Tax Commission. 
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Moreover, section 63-46a-12.1(l)(a) does not violate the constitutional authority 
of the Tax Commission under Article XIII, Section 11. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, 1 21, 979 P.2d 346. 
Salt Lake City Corp. involved a challenge by Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake 
City School District (collectively, "Salt Lake City") of a Tax Commission rule 
adopting the "straight line" flight path method for apportioning the taxable value of 
commercial airplanes among different taxing entities.5 Salt Lake City relied upon 
section 63-46a-12.1 for district court jurisdiction to review the administrative rule, but 
the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction, ruling that the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), 
rendered that section unconstitutional and deprived the court of jurisdiction to review 
Salt Lake City's challenge to the rule. 1999 UT 41 at f 18. In reversing and holding 
that the district court had misconstrued its holding in Evans & Sutherland, this Court 
noted that the statute struck down in that case provided for trial de novo in the district 
court, which purported to confer on the district court the power to adjust and equalize 
the valuation and assessment of property among the several counties - a power 
explicitly reserved to the Tax Commission under Article XIII, section 11 of the Utah 
5
 Prior to adoption of the Tax Commission's rule, Salt Lake City requested a rule, 
rejected by the Tax Commission, that would prohibit the straight line method of 
assessment and would rely instead on a formula based on the location of landings and 
takeoffs, under which Salt Lake City would receive virtually all of the apportioned 
revenue. 
22 
Constitution. Id. The Court instructed that "[i]n contexts other than de no\o re\ie\\. 
however, we have explicitly authorized traditional appellate re\iew." Id. at c 19. The 
Court stated that nothing in Evans & Sutherland deprives the district court of 
jurisdiction to review the legality of Tax Commission decisions or rules. Id. Where 
Salt Lake City sought a ruling declaring the straight line apportionment rule and 
method unconstitutional and illegal, the district court had jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1. Id. at t21. Indeed, the Court noted that "some form of 
traditional appellate judicial review is essential to ensure that the Tax Commission 
properly applies relevant law and does not act outside its jurisdiction." Id. at f 20 
(emphasis added). 
Like the plaintiffs in Salt Lake City Corp., Plaintiffs seek a ruling in this case 
declaring illegal the Tax Commission's rule relating to the levy of sales tax on the 
memberships in question. That challenge is permissible under section 63-46a-12.1 
(2001), which permits the district court, inter alia, to declare the rule nonapplicable to 
the Plaintiffs, and to declare an administrative rule invalid if the rule violates statutory 
law or the Tax Commission does not have authority to make the rule. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4)(a) and (b) (2001). This case, therefore, involves nothing more 
than traditional appellate judicial review of Tax Commission action to ensure that the 
Tax Commission properly applies the tax laws and does not act outside its jurisdiction 
in levying sales taxes. 
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2. Article XIII, Section 11(5) Of The Utah Constitution Does Not 
Require That All Issues Involving Taxation Issues Be Brought Before 
The Tax Commission Prior To Judicial Review. 
In spite of the clear language of section 63-46a-12.1 and the Court's opinion in 
Salt Lake City Corp., the Tax Commission contends that, under Article XIII, section 
11(5) of the Utah Constitution, all issues involving taxation must be brought before the 
Tax Commission prior to obtaining judicial review. Indeed, the Tax Commission 
apparently takes the position that Article XIII, section 11(5) limits the district court's 
authority to hear any tax case other than those on appeal from decisions of the Tax 
Commission. That expansive view is without basis inasmuch as section 11(5) was 
added to the Utah Constitution to expand - not limit - district court authority. 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 11(5) was voted on and approved by the voters of Utah 
during the 1998 election to allow this Court to hear appeals from Tax Commission 
decisions de novo. Section 11(5) was a grant of jurisdiction, not a limitation. The 
district court continues to have any and all other jurisdiction it has constitutionally 
notwithstanding that amendment. For instance, taxpayers have long had ability to go 
directly to district court on the following tax issues where no Tax Commission decision 
has been issued: 
1. To challenge a tax statute as being unconstitutional as recognized 
by this Court in several cases, including Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n, 1999 UT 41, 979 
P.2d 346; Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997); 
V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 
1997); and Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979); 
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To challenge the \ alidity of a Tax Commission rule under Utah 
Code Ann.~§ 63-46a-12.1 (2001); 
To obtain a refund of taxes for a class of taxpayers, as recognized 
b) this Court in Brumley v. Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1993); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1986); and Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 
1159, 1163 (Utah 1985); 
To issue declaratory rulings in tax cases, as recognized by this 
Court in Brumley v. Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993) (citing 
IML Freight v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975); Walker Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592 (1964); 
Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956); and 
Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 
P.2d 984 (1946)); 
To recover taxes paid under protest under Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-
1-301 and 59-2-1327 as recognized by this Court in several cases, 
including State Tax Commission v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 
1979); Peterson v. Bountiful City, 477 P.2d 153 (Utah 1970); 
McLaughlin v. Cluff, 66 Utah 245, 240 P. 161 (Utah 1925); Utah 
Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (Utah 
1923); Nutter v Carbon County, 58 Utah 1, 196 P. 1009 (Utah 
1921); Murdock v. Murdock, 38 Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (Utah 
1911); and Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 
Utah 395, 62 P. 1024 (Utah 1900); 
To recover taxes illegally or erroneously assessed under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-3-1321 as recognized by this Court and the Court 
of Appeals in several cases, including Utah Parks Co. v. Iron 
County, 14 Utah 2d 178, 380 P.2d 924 (Utah 1963); Shea v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941); Wilson v. 
Weber Co., 100 Utah 141, 111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941); Neilson v. 
San Pete County, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334 (Utah 1912); Blaine 
Hudson Printing v. Tax Comm'n, 870 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); and Stevenson v. Monson, 856 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); and 
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7. To recover a refund of transitory personal property taxes under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-402 (as recognized by Rule 6-103(4)(iii) 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration). 
When the 1998 constitutional amendment was passed, it did not limit district 
court authority on these matters, or alter laws relating to exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in any way. The amendment was passed in direct response to the 1997 case 
of Evans & Sutherland v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), where the Supreme 
Court declared the Utah Tax Court unconstitutional. Indeed, at the same time the 
Legislature passed Senate Joint Resolution 13 in 1998, allowing the constitutional 
amendment to be placed on the ballot, the Legislature also passed Senate Bill 62 
(1998), which explicitly stated that if the Constitutional amendment was approved by 
the voters, the tax court language struck down in Evans & Sutherland would be 
reinstated. The reason for both SJR 13 and SB 62 was to overturn Evans and 
Sutherland, and thus to expand the district court authority that had been taken away. 
In the 1998 voter information pamphlet (Add. Ex. 5), the impartial analysis 
regarding the constitutional amendment clearly states that the amendment was passed 
to "expand'1 the court's authority to hear appeals from Tax Commission decisions. 
The amendment was in no way a limitation. If it had been, the constitutional language 
would have said the district court could review "only matters decided by the State Tax 
Commission." The amendment did not, and its grant of additional authority to the 
district court did not limit the pre-existing district court authority in tax cases. 
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Accordingly the district court still has jurisdiction in at least the seven areas listed 
above, many of which, including section 63-46a-12.1, apph here. 
Moreover, the Tax Commission's decision to impose the sales tax on the 
memberships in question obviously satisfied the requirement that the Commission 
"decide" the "matter" when it enacted the rule imposing the tax and again when it 
required Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit the tax. See Bluth, 2001 UT App 
138 at 1 6. The Tax Commission would have this Court rule that enactment and 
collection of a new tax does not "decide" a matter until a taxpayer formally asks, in an 
adjudicative setting, whether the Tax Commission really meant to extract the tax in 
question. The court of appeals was correct in concluding that section 11(5) of the 
Constitution is satisfied in this case. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT HAS THE POWER NECESSARY TO FASHION 
AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
ACTION. 
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment ordering and adjudging that the Tax 
Commission exceeded its authority when it required Costco and Sam's Club to collect 
sales tax on the purchase of their annual memberships, and a refund of all sales taxes 
wrongfully imposed and collected by the Tax Commission in that regard. Complaint 
at 2, R. 4 (Add. Ex. 1). The Tax Commission contends, however, that the district 
court lacks authority under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001) to grant the relief 
requested, and, therefore, dismissal was appropriate for lack of jurisdiction. See Brief 
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of Tax Commission at 39-43. The Tax Commission's contention ignores both the 
district court's implied and statutory powers to carry into effect its power. 
If the district court finds that the Tax Commission exceeded its authority and 
imposed an illegal sales tax, the district court has both implied and statutory powers as 
are necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly given. See United States v. 
Clawson, 4 Utah 34, 5 P. 689, aff'd 114 U.S. 477, 5 S. Ct. 949, 29 L. Ed. 179 
(1885); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953)("Further relief based on a 
declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper.") For 
example, in Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985), 
a food service establishment brought a declaratory judgment action challenging a 
permit fee imposed by the Davis County Board of Health by arguing, inter alia, that 
the agency exceeded its statutory authority in imposing the fee. The Court held that 
the fee was invalid and, as supplemental relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
ordered the agency to refund the fees paid by the food service establishment. Id. at 
1164. 
The Tax Commission relies on Sheppick v. Albertsons, Inc., 922 P.2d 769 
(Utah 1996), in support of its argument that this case should be dismissed because the 
district court cannot fashion a complete remedy under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
That case is easily distinguishable and has no bearing on the issue of whether the 
district court in this case has the authority to order the remedy requested by Plaintiffs. 
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Sheppick invoked a declaratory judgment action under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. An employee originally was awarded permanent total disability 
benefits and medical benefits for treatment of a work-related injury to his spine. The 
employee subsequently asserted claims in district court against his former employer for 
bad faith and unfair dealing in refusing to pay his claim for medical expenses for an 
injury to a different part of his spine. The question of whether the employer was 
required under the Act to pay medical expenses for the new injury depended upon the 
factual finding of whether that injury was caused by the employee's industrial 
accident. The Court ruled that the Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction 
not only to issue compensation awards authorized by the Act but also to make the 
necessary factual findings upon which such awards are made. "[The plaintiffs] 
complaint for a declaratory judgment does not give the district court jurisdiction to rule 
on a matter committed to the authority of another adjudicatory body." 922 P.2d at 
775. The Court held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to 
make the factual finding necessary to order the requested remedy. Therefore, any 
judgment or decree entered by the district court would be a nullity. Id. 
In this case, however, the district court, under Section 63-46a-12.1, has subject 
matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Tax Commission had authority to impose 
the tax in question. Equipped with subject matter jurisdiction, the district court has the 
power under the Declaratory Judgment Act to grant such relief as may be necessary or 
proper. The grant of such relief does not depend upon any factual determination of the 
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Tax Commission - particularly not a factual determination mandated b\ statute, as was 
the case with the Industrial Commission under the Workers' Compensation Act in 
Sheppick. 
By entering a declaratory judgment that the Tax Commission has imposed an 
illegal tax and, as a consequence, ordering that the illegal tax collected be returned, the 
district court would be acting squarely within its authority under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1953). 
Moreover, such authority would not invade the "original jurisdiction" of the 
Tax Commission, as the Tax Commission apparently contends. While the 
Commission attempts to paint this case as one involving "a critical issue ... vital to the 
Commission in carrying out its constitutionally mandated functions," this case is 
nothing of the sort. Beyond pointing out that the Sales and Use Tax Act provides an 
administrative process by which the Tax Commission credits or refunds overpayment 
of taxes, the Tax Commission has cited no instance in which a declaratory judgment 
ordering a refund of an illegally collected tax invades the Tax Commission's core 
prerogatives. The Tax Commission, for example, could still use its administrative 
process to credit any ordered refund against any amount of tax, penalty and interest a 
particular taxpayer might owe under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(a)(i) (2000). 
See, e.g., Brumley at 799 (the district court, after deciding the legal issues and 
concluding that refunds should be paid, left factual determinations to the Tax 
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Commission; "ftjhus, the district court has not interfered with the core prerogathes of 
the Commission/'). 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN ITS ANALYSIS AND 
CONCLUSION THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF EXHAUSTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS SATISFIED IN THIS CASE. 
Properly concluding that a district court may review the legality of Tax 
Commission rules under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (2001) without a prior 
adjudicative proceeding by the Tax Commission (see Bluth, 2001 UT App 138, \ 6), 
the court of appeals then analyzed whether Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment class action 
satisfied any requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial 
review (id., \\ 7-9). The court of appeals correctly held that the irreparable harm 
exception to the exhaustion requirement was established in this action seeking a 
declaration that the Tax Commission has acted outside its authority to impose an illegal 
sales tax. 
1. Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Action Satisfied The Irreparable 
Harm Exception To The Exhaustion Requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 requires a person challenging administrative 
rules to exhaust that person's administrative remedies by complying with Section 63-
46a-12 before filing the complaint, unless compliance with Section 63-46a-12 would 
cause the person irreparable harm. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(2)(a) and 
(b)(iii) (2001). The court of appeals correctly concluded that the irreparable harm 
exception generally is satisfied in a declaratory judgment action such as this where the 
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Plaintiffs challenge the Tax Commission's very authority to impose the tax in question. 
See 2001 UT App 138, <[ 7. In so concluding, die court of appeals quoted this Court 
in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tea Commission, 1999 UT 12, 974 P.2d 286 
("Hercules'*), summarizing the holdings of Brumley v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 868 
P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) ("Brumley), and IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 
296, 298 (Utah 1975), to the effect that "a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust 
its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for declaratory relief." 2001 
UT App 138, 1 7, quoting Hercules, 1999 UT 12 at f 4. The court of appeals then 
proceeded to analyze whether the irreparable harm exception is applicable in this case. 
2001 UTApp 138, 1f1 8-9. 
Relying on Brumley, the court of appeals appropriately held that the irreparable 
harm exception to the exhaustion requirement was satisfied in this case. Like this 
case, Brumley was a declaratory judgment action against the Tax Commission brought 
by federal retirees seeking a refund of state income taxes paid on retirement income 
received from federal sources. This Court found no error in the trial court's 
conclusion that such a declaratory judgment action satisfied the irreparable harm 
exception where the action raised legal questions that could not have been finally 
determined by the Commission in an administrative hearing. 868 P.2d at 799. The 
legal issues raised in Brumley included whether the rule announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury should be applied 
retroactively, and whether plaintiffs were required to have paid their taxes under 
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protest and to ha\e brought their actions for refund within six months thereafter m 
district court. 868 P.2d at 799. 
In this case, the legal issues arose out of the Tax Commission's administrative 
action imposing sales tax on the annual memberships in question and include whether 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Tax Commission to impose and collect 
such a tax, which the Legislature has determined is an appropriate question for the 
district court to decide. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4)(a) (2001)("The district 
court may grant relief to the petitioner by (a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court 
finds that . . . the rule violates . . . statutory law or the agency does not have the legal 
authority to make the rule"). Like Brumley, this action raises a purely legal question 
that could not have been finally determined by the Tax Commission in an 
administrative proceeding. 
The court of appeals found further support for its holding in the particular 
circumstances of this case. In addition to the case involving a challenge to the Tax 
Commission's authority to impose the tax in question, the court noted that given the de 
minimis amount of money at stake and the threat of counterclaim hearings, exhaustion 
of administrative remedies would be futile and useless. 2001 UT 138 at \ 9, citing 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d 592, 595 (finding 
exhaustion of administrative remedies not required when there is a facial challenge to 
scope of agency authority); see also Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 
74, \ 14 ("Nebeker), quoting State Tax Comyn v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 
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1989)f*E\cepuons to [exhaustion] rule exist ... where it appears that exhaustion would 
serve no useful purpose"), and Johnson \\ Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 
1237 (Utah 1980)("Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be necessary when 
it would serve no useful purpose.").6 
With respect to the de minimis amount at stake for individual taxpayers, that 
circumstance plainly supports the court of appeals' conclusion that the irreparable 
harm standard was met in this case. When an illegal tax amounts to only a few dollars 
for each individual taxpayer, taxpayers would have no realistic day in court if they 
were each required to exhaust their administrative remedies. Cf. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2973, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 
(1985)(one of the essential purposes of class actions is to provide a feasible means for 
asserting rights of those who "would have no realistic day in court if a class action 
were not available"); Crow v. California Department of Human Resources, 325 F. 
Supp. 1314, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1970), cert, denied, 408 U.S. 924, 92 S. Ct. 2495, 33 
L. Ed. 2d 335 (1972)("where the class challenge is to widespread administrative 
6
 In arguing that the court of appeals' holding is clear error, the Tax Commission 
contends that the circumstances in this case justifying the irreparable harm exception 
should meet the standard of "irreparable injury" in System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). See Appellant's Brief at 22. "Irreparable injury" in that 
case is the standard in Utah to justify injunctive relief and is totally inapposite to the 
irreparable harm exception to exhaustion. Moreover, such a standard is clearly 
contrary to the jurisprudence of this Court in concluding that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies may not be required when it would serve "no useful purpose" 
or be "futile and useless" to do so. See Nebeker at 1 14. 
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procedures and no individual class member has a financial stake likely to provide the 
incentive for individual litigation, class action status should be granted"). Moreover, 
in this case there is no provision for a taxpayer class action before the Tax 
Commission. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-101 et seq. (1987) and § 63-46a-
1 et seq. (1997); see also Brumley v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1993) (Supreme Court found no error in trial court's conclusion that there were no 
means to certify a class before the Tax Commission). 
Additionally, class members could be irreparably harmed if this case were 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because they might forever 
lose the right to recover the illegal tax they paid during much of the period covered by 
this case. With a three-year statute of limitations for the refund of taxes paid {see Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(b)), the Tax Commission can be ordered to reimburse 
taxpayers for the illegal tax paid from September 1996 forward. If this case is 
dismissed and taxpayers are forced to petition individually, the three-year statute of 
limitations may limit reimbursement of the illegal tax to a period three years back from 
the new filing date. Thus, the illegal tax collected by the Tax Commission during the 
period from September 1996 to the date three years prior to any new filing might not 
be reimbursed and might be lost forever to the class members, in itself constituting 
irreparable harm. 
Finally, the Tax Commission's unwarranted threat to subject each and every 
taxpayer seeking a refund of the sales tax at issue here to a separate use tax inquisition 
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senes to further increase the futility and irreparable harm that would result from a 
proceeding before the Tax Commission. The exhaustion procedure that the Tax 
Commission proposes would single out for special adverse treatment each taxpayer 
who appears before it, resulting in a level of deterrence calculated and certain to create 
an inappropriate windfall for the State from the illegal tax imposed by the 
Commission. While such a procedure might have been appropriate in the era of the 
English Star Chamber or Spanish Inquisition, our modern system of justice should not 
countenance such a result.7 
2. An Exception To The Exhaustion Requirement Is Particularly 
Appropriate In This Class Action. 
As made clear by the Utah Supreme Court in Brumley, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1993), as verified by Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986) 
and Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985), 
and based on principles of fundamental fairness to taxpayers, the district court has 
jurisdiction and plenary authority to certify a class of plaintiffs in a tax refund case, 
and to declare that the grant of a refund to representative plaintiffs be applied to the 
class. This exercise of authority by the district court in hearing and ruling on the class 
certification and declaratory relief issues does not impinge on any responsibilities of 
7
 While Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure protects litigants from baseless 
claims and allegations, no such protection apparently exists for taxpayers appearing 
before the Tax Commission. 
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the Tax Commission, and exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus not necessan, 
because the Commission does not have authority to certify a class. 
The Supreme Court has also made it clear in Greater Park City Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 954 P.2d 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) that the companies that collect 
sales tax and remit it to the Tax Commission do not have standing to seek a refund. 
Accordingly, when widespread over-taxation occurs through relatively small tax 
collections that do not warrant individual actions, a class action provides the only 
available avenue for relief. 
To allow such widespread illegal taxation to go unremedied would be a blatant 
disregard of the law and our country's ideals. The right to fair and legal taxation lies 
at the heart of our nation, and indeed, was a basic principle upon which the country 
was founded. A tax revolt created our nation, and an aversion to unfair taxation has 
always been deeply rooted in American political culture. The principles of fair 
taxation established by our forefathers in the Constitution cannot be ignored just 
because the illegal taxes paid do not warrant individual actions for recovery. The 
illegitimate taxation in this case must thus be rectified through a class action, and the 
requirement of exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. See State Tax Com'n v. 
Iverson, supra, and Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, supra. 
3. The Decision Is Not In Conflict With Hercules. 
The Tax Commission erroneously contends that the court of appeals erred in its 
interpretation of Hercules. See Brief of Tax Commission at 32-34. The only 
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reference to Hercules in the court of appeals' opinion is to quote the proposition that 
"a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to 
maintaining an action for declaratory relief." In that regard, the court of appeals also 
cited as support Brumley and Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra. 
Additionally, the court of appeals specifically addressed the issue whether Plaintiffs' 
action qualified for the irreparable harm exception to the exhaustion requirement, 
concluding that the action did, without any further reference to or reliance upon 
Hercules. See 2001 UT 138 at U 8-9. 
The holding of Hercules is inapposite to this case and certainly is not in conflict 
with the decision of the court of appeals. Hercules involved an appeal from an order 
dismissing Hercules' declaratory judgment action against the Auditing Division of the 
Tax Commission. Following an audit, pursuant to law the Auditing Division assessed 
corporate franchise tax deficiencies against Hercules. Hercules disputed the 
deficiencies found by the Tax Commission and commenced a formal adjudicative 
proceeding before the Tax Commission. In that proceeding, Hercules moved 
unsuccessfully for a protective order precluding the Auditing Division from conducting 
discovery. After denial of the motion and while the adjudicative proceeding was 
pending before the Tax Commission, Hercules filed a separate action in district court 
seeking a declaration that the Administrative Code did not permit discovery from a 
taxpayer. The trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment action "on the grounds 
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that the action was an improper attempt to seek judicial review of an interlocutory Tax 
Commission order in a pending adjudicative proceeding." 1999 UT 12, c 4. 
Hercules asserted that the trial court erred by, in effect, incorrectly requiring 
Hercules to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to seeking declaratory relief. 
While summarizing the holdings of Brumley and IML Freight, Inc. v. Otto sen, 538 
P.2d 296 (Utah 1975), to the effect "that a plaintiff is not generally required to exhaust 
its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for declaratory relief," this 
Court correctly noted that such cases are inapposite. Id. at 1 4. In Hercules - unlike 
Brumley and IML Freight - the corporate taxpayer, Hercules, was a party to a pending 
formal adjudicative proceeding concerning a factual matter. This Court merely held 
that Hercules, as a party to a pending formal adjudicative proceeding, could not 
collaterally attack an interlocutory order issued in that proceeding by filing a separate 
declaratory judgment action in district court. Id. at t 8. 
Neither the outcome of Hercules nor this Court's holding in that case in any 
way conflicts with the decision of the court of appeals in this case. The taxpayers in 
this case are not parties to a pending formal adjudicative proceeding and have not 
attacked an interlocutory order of the Tax Commission in such a proceeding. Indeed, 
this Court expressly noted that a case such as this - where the parties were not already 
involved in a pending adjudicative proceeding - is inapposite to a case such as 
Hercules. Id. at 1 4. 
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The Tax Commission is flatly wrong in its contention that it was plain error for 
the court of appeals to state that u[i]n this jurisdiction, "a plaintiff is not generally 
required to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to maintaining an action for 
declaratory relief."' Brief of Tax Commission at 44-45, quoting Bluth v. Tax 
Commission, 2001 UT 138, f 7, quoting Hercules, 1999 UT 12, <[ 4. It is not "plain 
error" to quote a proposition directly from an opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. 
4. The Court Of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict With Other Utah 
Case Law Dealing With Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies In 
Declaratory Judgment Actions. 
The Tax Commission cites various cases specifically to show that Utah courts 
have dismissed declaratory judgment actions for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. Brief of Tax Commission at 35-36. Those cases, however, are inapposite 
to this case. For example, the Tax Commission highlights Baird v. State, 51A P.2d 
713 (Utah 1978) as a pertinent case ignored by the court of appeals in its decision. 
The Tax Commission cites Baird for the broad proposition that the exhaustion 
requirement will not be excused in declaratory judgment actions. The case says 
nothing of the sort, nor is it relevant to the issue of whether compliance with the 
exhaustion requirement in Section 63-46a-12 would cause Plaintiffs and the class 
irreparable harm. 
Baird involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of 
the Utah OSHA. The plaintiff merely alleged that he was both employed and an 
employer but did not allege any specific injury sustained or threatened to him 
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personally as a result of the passage of the Utah OSHA. The case centered on the 
plaintiffs abstract allegations concerning the constitutionality of the Utah OSHA, with 
the Court holding that the declaratory judgment action could not be maintained because 
there was not a justiciable controversy, the plaintiff lacked standing and did not have a 
legal interest in the controversy that could be protected, and the issues between the 
parties involved were not ripe for judicial determination. 
Moreover, in this case, section 63-46a-12.1 expressly provides for declaratory 
action by the district court in the context of seeking judicial review of a rule. See, 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(4) ("The district court may grant relief to the 
petitioner by: (a) declaring the rule invalid, if the court finds that: (i) the rule violates 
constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority to make 
the rule ....") (emphasis added).8 The issue still remains, of course, whether Plaintiffs 
needed to exhaust their administrative remedies under section 63-46a-12, but Baird 
does not deal with that issue, i.e., whether compliance with section 63-46a-12 would 
cause Plaintiffs and the class irreparable harm, thereby obviating the need to exhaust. 
Similarly, the cases of Davis v. Robinson, 871 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
and Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), are inapposite. Davis 
8
 See Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1162 ml 
(Utah 1985)(The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, which applies to all state 
agencies, "expressly provides for declaratory judgment actions to test any agency 
rule", citing section 63-46a-13 of the act. That section was repealed in 1990, at the 
time section 63-46a-12.1 was enacted, which latter section incorporated declaratory 
judgment language.) 
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involved a doctor's challenge to disciplinary actions taken against him under the 
Medical Practices Act. The plaintiff doctor filed a declaratory judgment action 
asserting that the statutes under which the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing was proceeding were unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the 
action, ruling that the plaintiff should pursue his remedies in the pending 
administrative proceeding to revoke his license. The plaintiff appealed to the court of 
appeals, which affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs remedy under the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act was to petition for judicial review of the final 
agency action, which had concluded by that time. 
The court of appeals in Davis does not say - as the Tax Commission at least 
intimates (see Brief of Tax Commission at 35) ~ that all declaratory judgment actions 
should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. That case stands 
for the propositions that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for judicial 
review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicatory proceedings, and that 
a declaratory judgment action may be dismissed if the plaintiff fails to follow that 
process. In this case, a process has been established under section 63-46a-12.1 of the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act that expressly allows for a district court to 
declare that a rule violates statutory law or the agency does not have the legal authority 
to make the rule. That procedure is expressly available to Plaintiffs and the class they 
represent so long as they exhaust their administrative remedy contained in Section 63-
46a-12 or compliance is not necessary for reasons of irreparable harm. Cases such as 
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Davis and Kitnz' are not on point and provide no authority to resolve the pertinent 
issue in this case. 
Similarly, the Tax Commission cites numerous other cases that likewise do not 
pertain to the issue in this case of whether compliance with section 63-46a-12 would 
cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs and the class they represent. For example, the 
Tax Commission cites to cases where writs of mandamus were denied for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. E.g., Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897 
P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(mandamus action against developer improper -
plaintiffs complaint was against county commission that approved developer's plat; 
under Utah law, plaintiff was required to appeal decision of county commission to the 
board of adjustment); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980)(mandamus 
action to require county commission and county planning commission to approve 
subdivision plat dismissed when plat had not been presented to county commission for 
approval, as required under state law); and Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning 
and Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)(plaintiffs failure to appeal 
9
 Kurtz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), involved a declaratory 
judgment action to declare signs on property adjacent to the interstate to be in 
compliance with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. The court of appeals ruled that 
the plaintiff failed to request agency action under UDOT rules, seeking adjudicative 
proceedings to determine whether the sign permits should have been granted. The 
case does not pertain to the issue in this case whether, under the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, Plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedy under 
section 63-46a-12. 
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revocation of his building permit to board of adjustment precluded him from seeking 
relief from courts by way of mandamus). 
In those cases, the plaintiffs attempted to use a writ of mandamus as a substitute 
for following the appropriate administrative appeal process set forth by statute. In this 
case, the statute expressly permits Plaintiffs to seek district court review, subject only 
to compliance with Section 63-46a-12, if necessary. 
Finally, the Tax Commission cites a host of other Utah cases for the proposition 
that "review of agency decisions should be limited to those cases where administrative 
remedies have been exhausted." Brief of Tax Commission at 38-39. Like the other 
cases cited by the Tax Commission discussed above, these cases all involved statutes 
and issues not even remotely similar to this case where judicial review is expressly 
provided under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for 
further proceedings on the merits. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
> V ^ i' pv>if 
/jPxmias R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Jon V. Harper 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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Judge \Vtik l r K L l ^ . •I... 
Defendant 
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and any and all persons and entities similarly 
situated, complain against Defendant and allege as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a class action, brought on behalf of the named Plaintiffs, and a class of persons 
and entities who, at any time during the last five years, have paid Utah Sales Tax on the cost of 
purchasing or renewing their membership in the Costco Wholesale Corporation (hereinafter 
"Costco") and/or WalMart Stores, Inc. d/b/a Sam's Club (hereinafter "Sam's Club"). 
The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class are seeking first a declaratory 
judgment, ordering and adjudging that the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter "the 
Commission"), exceeded its statutory authority when it required Costco and Sam's Club to 
collect the Utah Sales Tax on the cost of purchasing or renewing Costco and Sam's Club 
memberships. 
Secondly, Plaintiffs and the members of the class are seeking a refund of any and all 
sales taxes which they paid during the class period on the purchase or renewal of Costco 
and/or Sam's Club memberships, together with interest thereon at the statutory rate. 
PARTIES AND VENUE 
1. Named Plaintiffs Tyler W. Bluth and Heidi T. Orme, husband and wife, are residents of 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Named Plaintiff Michael Vail is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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3. Named Plaintiff Peter Wimbrow is a resident of Davis County, Utah. 
4. The Utah State Tax Commission is an entity created by Utah Const, art. XIII. §11, 
and Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-201. The Commission is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Commission is responsible for administering the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, as found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et seq. 
5. Costco Wholesale Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Costco") is a Washington 
corporation, registered with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code to do business 
in Utah. Costco owns and operates at least two stores wherein it transacts business in the state 
of Utah, county of Salt Lake. 
6. WalMart Stores, Inc., d/b/a Sam's Club (hereinafter referred to as "Sam's Club") is a 
Delaware corporation, registered with the Division of corporations and Commercial Code to 
do business in Utah. Sam's Club owns and operates at least two stores wherein it transacts 
business in the State of Utah, county of Salt Lake. 
7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-7 and 63-30-17. 
8. The Plaintiff class consists of any and all persons and entities who have paid Utah Sales 
Tax on the cost of new Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships and/or one or more renewals 
of their existing Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships at any time during the class period. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. In order to shop at either of the Costco or Sam's Club warehouses located in Utah, the 
consumer must purchase a membership. Costco and Sam's Club both offer several different 
types of membership, including individual memberships, memberships for couples, and group 
memberships available to businesses and other organizations. 
10. Once purchased, memberships must be renewed annually, and the customer must pay a 
fee to renew the membership each year. 
11. At all times relevant to this claim, which includes the entire time prior to the filing of this 
claim for which wrongfully assessed and collected taxes are recoverable by the person or entity 
paying those taxes (hereinafter referred to as "the class period"), the State of Utah has, pursuant 
to the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act (codified in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et 
seq.), imposed a sales tax upon certain transactions. 
12. At all times during the class period, the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act 
have imposed the sales tax on retail sales of tangible personal property. 
13. At all times during the class period, there has been a statute of the State of Utah, 
namely Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(24), which has defined the term "sale" and which has 
contained an enumeration of certain types of other transactions which are included within the 
definition of "sale." 
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14. At all times during the class period, there has been a statute of the State of Utah. . 
namely Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f), which has imposed Utah Sales Tax on 
admission or user fees for theaters, movies, operas, museums, planetariums, 
shows of any type or nature, exhibitions, concerts, carnivals, amusement parks, 
amusement rides, circuses, menageries, fairs, races, contests, sporting events, 
dances, boxing and wrestling matches, closed circuit television broadcasts, 
billiard or pool parlors, bowling lanes, golf and miniature golf, golf driving 
ranges, batting cages, skating rinks, ski lifts, ski runs, ski trails, snowmobile 
trails, tennis courts, swimming pools, water slides,, river runs, jeep tours, boat 
tours, other amusement, entertainment, recreation, exhibition, cultural, or 
athletic activity. 
15. At all times during the class period, the Commission has claimed that it has had, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-210 and 59-12-118, the statutory authority to promulgate regulations 
to implement the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 et seq., and has promulgated, 
pursuant to the above cited sections, the "Sales and Use Tax Rules," (codified as Utah. Admin. 
R.865-19S-1 etseq.). 
16. At all times during the class period, there has existed an administrative rule, 
promulgated by the Commission, entitled "Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 59-12-102 and 59-12-103," and number R.865-19S-33, which reads as follows: 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission 
includes the amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in 
an auditorium, theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or 
gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. Admission also includes the 
right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such 
charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such 
similar charge. 
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1. This applies whether the charge made for the use of the seat, table, 
or similar accommodation is combined with an admission charge to 
form a single charge, or is separate and distinct from an admission 
charge, or is the sole charge. 
B. "Annual membership dues paid to a private organization" includes only 
those dues paid by members who, directly or indirectly, establish the level 
of the dues. 
C. "Season passes" include amounts paid to participate in specific activities, 
once annual membership dues have been paid. 
D. If the original admission charge carries the right to remain in a place, or to 
use a seat or table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only, 
and an additional charge is made for an extension of such time, the extra 
charge is paid for admission within the meaning of the law. Where a 
person or organization acquires the sole right to use any place or the right 
to dispose of all of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions, 
the amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions. Such a transaction 
constitutes a rental of the entire place and if the person or organization in 
turn sells admissions, sales tax applies to amounts paid for such admissions. 
E. Annual membership dues may be paid in installments during the year. 
F. Amounts paid for the following activities are not admissions or user fees: 
1. lessons, public or private; 
2. sign up for amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a state 
governmental entity, or a nonprofit corporation or organization, the 
primary purpose of which, as stated in the corporation's or 
organization's articles or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and 
encouraging of amateur athletics; 
3. sign up for participation in school activities. Sign up for 
participation in school activities excludes attendance as a spectator 
at school activities. 
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G. If amounts charged for activities listed in F. are billed along with 
admissions or user fees, the amounts not subject to the sales tax must be 
listed separately on the invoice in order to remain untaxed. 
17. At all times during the class period there has existed an administrative rule, 
promulgated by the Commission, entitled Meal Tickets, Coupon Books, and Merchandise 
Cards Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-103," and number R.865-19S-62, which 
reads as follows: 
A. Meal tickets, coupon books, or merchandise cards sold by persons engaged in 
selling taxable commodities or services are taxable, and the tax shall be billed 
collected on the selling price at the time the tickets, books, or cards are sold. 
Tax is to be added at the subsequent selection and delivery of the merchandise 
or services if an additional charge is made. 
18. On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah 
Admin. R.865-19S-33, representatives of the Commission have determined that membership 
fees at Costco and Sam's Club are "admission" fees and have therefore ordered and directed 
Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the class period, impose and collect the Utah 
Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships that permit the member 
shop at Costco or Sam's Club. 
19. On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah 
Admin. R.865-19S-62, representatives of the Commission have determined that membership 
fees at Costco and Sam's Club are for the sale of "merchandise cards" and have therefore 
ordered and directed Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the class period, impose 
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and collect the Utah Sale Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships that 
permit the member to shop at Costco or Sam's Club. 
20. On information and belief Plaintiffs allege that, purporting to act pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-103(1) representatives of the Commission have determined that membership fees 
at Costco and Sam's Club are "considered taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or 
service provided" and ordered and directed Costco and Sam's Club to, at all times during the 
class period, impose and collect the Utah Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of 
memberships that permit the member to shop at Costco or Sam's Club. 
21. At all times during the class period Costco and Sam's Club have, in reliance upon the 
Commission's purported authority under Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, R.865-19S-62, Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1), and the directives of the Commission, imposed and collected the 
Utah Sales Tax on the price for the purchase and renewal of memberships, and, on information 
and belief Plaintiffs allege that Costco and Sam's Club have remitted, or are intending to remit, 
all such collected sales tax to the Commission. 
22. At all times during the class period, the named Plaintiffs and each of the members of the 
class have, when they purchased new Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships and each time 
they purchased renewed memberships, paid the Utah Sales Tax. 
23. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission to require the collection 
of the Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and Sam's Club memberships is, 
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and at all times during the class period has been, illegal, null, void, and unenforceable for 
reasons, including but not limited to the following: 
A. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, does not find 
support in, does not comport with and is contrary to the provisions of the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act. 
B. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the 
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that it 
does not interpret, construe, implement, or enforce any existing statute of the 
state of Utah. 
C. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the 
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that, 
without the benefit of any legislative authority, it creates a new category of 
transaction to which the Utah Sales Tax would apply. 
23. Even if the Commission's interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 is properly within 
the authority of the Commission and is otherwise enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships 
at Costco and Sam's Club because those memberships are not within the definition of 
"admissions." Membership at Costco or Sam's Club is not required to gain access to those 
facilities, but rather is required before purchases may be made at those facilities. 
9 
24. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission to require the collection 
of the Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and Sam's Club memberships is, 
and at all times during the class period has been, illegal, null void, and unenforceable for 
reasons, including but not limited to the following: 
A. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, does not find 
support in, does not comport with and is contrary to the provisions of the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act. 
B. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the 
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that it 
does not interpret, construe, implement, or enforce any existing statute of the 
state of Utah. 
C. Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the Commission, exceeds the 
authority of the Commission to promulgate regulations for the reason that, 
without the benefit of any legislative authority, it creates a new category of 
transaction to which the Utah Sales Tax would apply. 
25. Even if the Commission's interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 is properly within 
the authority of the Commission and is otherwise enforceable, it is inapplicable to memberships 
at Costco and Sam's Club because those memberships are not a sale of "merchandise cards." 
Payment of membership fees at Costco and Sam's Club entitles a member to shop at Costco or 
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Sam's Club and, while Sam's Club and Costco both issue membership cards to their members as 
evidence of those memberships, the membership cards are not sold. Membership cards are the 
property of Sam's Club or Costco, not the member. Membership cards are issued solely for 
Sam's Club and Costco's administrative purposes to evidence membership. There is no charge 
to replace a lost or stolen membership card. 
26. The Commission's directive, purportedly based upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1), to 
Costco and Sam's Club to collect sales tax on memberships because they are "considered taxable 
as part of the sales price of merchandise" exceeds the Commission's authority because Costco 
and Sam's Club memberships are not part of the sale price of merchandise purchased at Costco 
and/or Sam's Club. Membership fees have no relation to either the quantity or price of 
merchandise purchased at Costco or Sam's Club, and members are in no way required to 
purchase anything at Costco or Sam's Club. Membership simply entitles the member to 
purchase merchandise at Costco or Sam's Club at a price determined by Costco and/or Sam's 
Club. 
27. The named Plaintiffs and the members of the class, and each and every one of them, have 
been damaged by having to pay the wrongfully and unlawfully imposed and collected Utah Sales 
Tax on the purchase and/or each renewal of their Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
28. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and entities. 
29. The Class shall include all persons and entities who, at any time during the class period 
purchased and/or renewed a Costco and/or Sam's Club membership, and who were charged the 
Utah Sales Tax on the cost of the membership purchase and/or renewal(s). It is reasonable to 
anticipate that: a.) some members of the class will have been Costco and/or Sam's Club members 
prior to the commencement of the class period, and will accordingly only have paid Utah Sales 
Tax on one or more annual membership renewals during the class period; b.) additional members 
of the class will have become members during the class period, and will have paid Utah Sales 
Tax both on an original membership and on one or more renewals; and c.) some members will 
have joined Costco and/or Sam's Club for the first time within the last year, and others will have 
joined during the class period but never renewed their memberships, with the consequence, in 
either instance, that they will have paid Utah Sales Tax only on an original membership. All 
such persons and entities, including the named Plaintiffs, shall be collectively referred to herein 
as the "Class" or the "members of the Class." 
30. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class as Plaintiffs herein is 
impracticable. The named Plaintiffs allege based upon information and belief that there are tens 
of thousands of persons and entities who are members of the Class. 
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31. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of all members of the Class, 
regardless of when they became Costco and/or Sam\s Club members, and all members of the 
Class sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct of the Commission, which is 
in violation of Utah law, as described herein. 
32. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. They 
have retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. Their counsel are 
regularly and continuously engaged in the prosecution of a large number of class acion lav/suits 
in both state and federal courts, both in Utah and in a number of other jurisdictions. 
33. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy. The members of the Class number in the tens of thousands, and its 
membership is spread throughout the State of Utah, so that joinder of all members is 
impracticable. It would also be impracticable for each member of the Class to bring separate 
actions. The individual damages of any one Class member will be relatively small when 
measured against the potential costs of bringing this action, making the expense and burden of 
this litigation unjustifiable for individual actions. In this class action, the court can determine the 
rights of the named Plaintiffs and all members of the Class with judicial economy. The named 
Plaintiffs do not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this suit as a class action. 
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34. The common questions of law and fact that exist as to all members of the Class and 
clearly predominate o\ei any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class include. 
but are not limited to, the following: 
a. Whether the Commission has, or at any time during the Class period had, the 
authority to interpret Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 
to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships. 
b. Whether Utah Admin. R.865-10S-33 or Utah Admin. R. 865-19S-62, as 
inteipreted by the Commission to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco 
and Sam's Club memberships, properly and lawfully implements any statute of 
the State of Utah pertaining to sales tax. 
c. Whether, based upon its interpretation of Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah 
Admin. R.865-19S-62 as requiring payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and 
Sam's Club memberships, the Commission can, or at any time during the class 
period could, lawfully require Costco and/or Sam's Club to impose and collect 
Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club 
memberships. 
d. Whether Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 or Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62. is now. or 
has been at any time during the class period, applicable to the purchase or renewal 
of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
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Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Commission to require 
Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah Sales Tax on purchase or renewal of 
Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships because said memberships "are 
considered taxable as part of the sales price of merchandise or service provided." 
Whether the Commission must refund all of the Utah Sales Tax paid, during the 
Class period, by the Plaintiffs and the members of the class on the purchase and 
renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
Whether the Commission must pay the Plaintiffs and members of the class 
interest on all monies which it has received or will receive from Costco and/or 
Sam's Club as a result of the collection, by Costco and/or Sam's Club, of sales 
tax on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
If the Plaintiffs and the members of the class are entitled to recover interest then 
it will be necessary to determine the applicable rate of interest and the date or 
dates from which interest will be assessed. 
Whether the members of the class are entitled to an order enjoining the 
Commission from any further attempts to enforce Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33, 
Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, or Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) in any way that 
compels Costco and Sam's Club to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on initial 
and renewal memberships. 
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35. The party opposing the Class has acted on grounds that are universally applicable to the 
Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to 
the class as a whole appropriate. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Judgment - Refund of Taxes Paid) 
36. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are, based upon all of the foregoing allegations, 
which are incorporated herein as though set out in full, seeking a Declaratory Judgment for the 
refund, together with interest, of wrongfully paid taxes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
110. 
37. There is an actual controversy within the jurisdiction of this Court, and declaratory relief 
will provide an effective and efficacious means for terminating uncertainty and resolving 
controversy by adjudicating the rights and interests of the parties with respect to the following 
acts and events: 
a. the Commission has enforced and will, absent an order from this court, continue 
to enforce Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, by requiring 
Costco and Sam's Club to impose and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and 
renewal of memberships; 
b. Costco and Sam's Club have assessed and collected and will, absent an order 
from this Court, continue to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and 
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renewal of their memberships, and have remitted or will remit this tax to the 
Commission; and, 
c. The Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been compelled to pay and will, 
absent an order from this Court, continue to be compelled to pay Utah Sales Tax on the 
purchase and renewal of their Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
38. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq., this Court has the authority to declare 
that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62, as interpreted by the 
Commission to require payment of Utah Sales Tax on Costco and Sam's Club memberships, 
are not now and, during the Class period, never have been lawful, in that such interpretations 
are not now and, during the Class period, never have been authorized by the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. §59-12-101 et seq. and that such interpretations do not now 
properly implement and, during the Class period, never have properly implemented any 
provision of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-103(f) and 59-12-102(l)(b). 
39. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq., this Court has the authority to declare 
that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are not now and, during the 
Class period, never have been applicable as a matter of fact and of law to initial and renewal 
memberships at Costco and/or Sam's Club. 
40. This Court has the authority to declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and 
Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful as interpreted by the Commission or inapplicable on 
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the facts of this case, Costco and Sam's Club should not be and should not have been required 
to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's Club 
memberships and, upon doing so, the Court has the authority to order the Commission to 
refund to the Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class any and all funds that have been or 
that may be paid to the Commission as a result of the collection by Costco and Sam's Club, at 
any time since the commencement of the Class period, of Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and 
renewal of memberships. 
41. This Court has the authority to declare that nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) 
authorizes the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax 
on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships because the 
Commission's determination that memberships *6are considered taxable as part of the sales price 
of merchandise or service provided" is factually and legally in error. 
42. This Court has the authority to determine that interest is payable on any funds that must 
be refunded by the Commission to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class and if 
so, to determine the applicable rate of interest and the date or dates from which interest is 
payable and, upon doing so, this Court has the authority to determine the amount of interest 
due to Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class and to order that such interest be paid 
by the Commission to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class. 
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43. This Court has the authority to make all such other, further and additional rulings as are 
needed fully and completely to resolve any and all issues that are raised by this Complaint. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Relief - Injunction) 
44. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are, based upon all of the foregoing allegations, 
which are incorporated herein as though set out in full, seeking a Declaratory Judgment 
providing for injunctive relief, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. 
45. This Court has the authority to declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and 
Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful as interpreted by the Commission or inapplicable to 
the facts of this case, and because nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) gives the 
Commission authority to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax 
on the purchase and renewal of Costco and/or Sam's Club memberships as "part of the sales 
price of merchandise," the Commission cannot require Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah 
Sales Tax on any future purchases or renewals of Costco and Sam's Club memberships and 
upon doing so the Court has the authority to order the Commission to inform Costco and 
Sam's Club that Utah Sales Tax should no longer be assessed and collected on the purchase or 
renewal of memberships, and to enjoin the Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club 
to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of memberships. 
WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFFS PRAY FOR RELIEF AS FOLLOWS: 
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A. That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
33-1 et seq., that Utah Admin. R.865-19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62. as interpreted 
by the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on 
their membership fees, are, and, at all times since the commencement of the class period, have 
been either unlawful or inapplicable to the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's Club 
memberships and that nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1) authorizes the Commission 
to order Costco and Sam's Club to collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees 
as "part of the sales price of merchandise." 
B. That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-
19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful or inapplicable and because Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-103(1) does not authorize the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to 
collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees, Costco and Sam's Club should not 
be and, at all times since the commencement of the Class period, should not have been 
required to assess and collect Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco and Sam's 
Club memberships. 
C. That the Court order, adjudge, decree and declare that, because Utah Admin. R.865-
19S-33 and Utah Admin. R.865-19S-62 are unlawful or inapplicable, and because Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-103 does not authorize the Commission to require Costco and Sam's Club to 
collect and remit Utah Sales Tax on their membership fees, the Plaintiffs and members of the 
Plaintiff Class should not be and, at all times since the commencement of the Class period, 
should not have been required to pay Utah Sales Tax on the purchase or renewal of Costco 
and/or Sam's Club memberships. 
D. That the Court order the Commission to refund to the Plaintiffs and members of the 
Plaintiff Class any and all funds that have been or that may be paid to the Commission as a 
result of the collection by Costco and Sam's Club, at any time after the commencement of the 
Class period, of Utah Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of memberships. 
E. That the Court make all determinations necessary to compute the amount of interest that 
is due to the Plaintiffs and members of the Class under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-402(2) on any 
and all funds that have been or that may be paid to the Commission as a result of the collection 
by Costco and Sam's Club, at any time after the commencement of the Class period, of Utah 
Sales Tax on the purchase and renewal of memberships and that the Court order the 
Commission to pay interest to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class in the 
amount that the Court determines is due. 
F. That the Court order the Commission to inform Costco and Sam's Club that Utah Sales 
Tax should no longer be imposed on the purchase or renewal of memberships, and enjoin the 
Commission from requiring Costco and Sam's Club to collect Utah Sales Tax imposed on the 
purchase or renewal of memberships. 
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G. That the Court make all such other, further, and additional rulings as are needed in 
order to fully and completely resolve any and all issues that are raised by this Complaint. 
H. For such other and further relief as is just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED: S e p t e m b e r ^ 1999. 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED 
and 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
Scott A. Call 
Victoria Coombs Bushnell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and the Class 
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1 every one of those individuals and refunded over $2 million 
2 to each of those individuals on our own. 
3 " The Tax Commission wants to get it right. They 
4 want to do it right. They're not out there putting guns to 
5 somebody's head and extorting money. The Tax Commission is 
6 setup and could and would, if it was found that this money 
7 was collected improperly, refund it to all the individuals. 
8 Now the only irreparable harm would be that Mr. 
9 Karrenberg wouldn't get his fees. I mean, that's not 
10 irreparable harm. The Tax Commission can address this harm 
11 to each individual. They can come in. There's no filing 
12 fee at the Tax Commission. There's no requirement of being 
13 represented by counsel. They can file a written letter 
14 with no particular format, to file a claim. And the other 
15 problem is that each of these individuals would have to 
16 come in and have some type of a hearing to establish the 
17 individual amounts that they're entitled to. The Tax 
18 Commission is entitled to offset, before refund, any other 
19 taxes owed. It is my assertion and if this case moves 
20 forward it will be our counterclaim that the Tax Commission 
21 is entitled to a counterclaim against every claimant for 
22 any use tax that is not paid by them. Every time you buy 
23 something from Lands End or another catalog or over the 
24 internet, bring that into the State without paying the tax 
25 you're liable for the use tax on that. If they haven't 
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1 paid that use tax we're entitled to an offset for any 
2 amounts that they've purchased and there, since there's no 
3 filing there's no statute of limitations. We can go back 
4 as far as we can obtain records to determine what those 
5 amounts are and we're entitled to that offset. 
6 Mr. Karrenberg has talked about Brumlee. Brumlee 
7 went to the Court because they raised a constitutional 
8 challenge to the statute that could not be decided by the 
9 Tax Commission. That's the only reason the Court took 
10 Brumlee is because what they were challenging is the 
11 constitutionality of the Utah taxing scheme. The Tax 
12 Commission doesn't have authority to rule on the 
13 constitutionality of the taxing scheme. There's no 
14 constitutional question here. The Tax Commission simply 
15 asked to apply their own rules and interpret the taxing 
16 statute, something that they have the constitutional 
17 authority and duty to do and something that they do every 
18 single day. 
19 In Johnson the Court stated that the mere 
20 introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the 
21 need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Therefore, 
22 even if there was a constitutional question it doesn't 
23 necessarily mean that you can go straight to District 
24 Court. 
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05/22/97; 19251, NSC, 06/06/97; 19245, AMD, 07/03/97; 19406, AMD, 08/21/97; 19407, 
AMD, 08/21/97; 19408, AMD, 08/21/97; 19409, AMD, 08/21/97; 19410, AMD, 08/21/97; 
19422, AMD, 08/21/97; 19442, AMD, 08/21/97; 19750, NSC, 11/01/97; 19931, AMD, 
U/05/97; 19932, AMD, 11/05/97; 20828, AMD, 05/04/98; 21195, AMD, 08/11/98; 21220, 
AMD, 08/11/98; 21323, AMD, 10/14/98. 
NOTES: 
NOTES CONSTRUING PORTIONS OF THIS RULE OR FORMER, SIMILAR RULE 
ADMISSION. 
"Admission" is defined in terms of the right to enter a place and not in terms of a fee 
charged to use facilities or equipment within a place; the definition merely incorporates the 
plain and settled meaning of "admission." Therefore, the Tax Commission's decision that an 
indoor entertainment mall was liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating, 
batting cages, and laser tag was incorrect since these were only fees charged to do particular 
things. (Former R865-19-33S.) 49th Street Gallena v. Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah a . 
Ap_p. 1993J, cert, denied, 87_8.P.2d 1154 (Utah 19941. 
APPLICATION. 
Seller of modular units to dealers before the units were permanently attached sold tangible 
personal property, not improvements to real estate or completed homes. Therefore, seller 
owed sales tax pursuant to his statutory duty to collect and remit taxes. (Former R865-58S-
1.) Valgardson Hou.s_.Sys. v. State Tax Comm n, 849 P.2d 618 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
859 P.2d 585__UJ.a_.1993) 
This rule applies to the resale of an item traded in as part of a purchase price, but not 
subsequent use other than a resale. (Former R865-19-72S.) KnowJe.dge_Data.Sys._v,. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1387 (Utan Ct. App. 1993). 
Because sales tax is not levied on real property transfers, a real property contractor, a 
contractor who purchases materials and incorporates those materials into real property 
improvements, is considered the ultimate consumer of the property for purposes of imposing 
a sales tax. Therefore, although taxpayer entered into a joint venture agreement in which co-
venturer was responsible for installation, taxoayer remained the real property contractor as 
he was ultimately responsible for installation and consequently he remained liable for the 
taxes assessed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Nieoemauser Ornamental8_Metal Works Co._y._Tax 
Comm n, 858 P.2d 1034 (Utan C: Ape 1993,. cert, denied, 870 P.2d.957.(Utah 1994J. 
COMPUTER SERVICES. 
- PRIMARY OBJECT OF SALE. 
When manufacturing company provided comouter company engineering drawings to be 
scanned and converted into a computer-readable form, the transaction was primarily a 
service, not a new taxable purcnase of tangible personal property that the customer did not 
previously own. Eaton Kenway, lnc v Auditing Div. of Utah.StateJax Comm'n, 906_P.2d 882 
(Utah 1995). 
-- SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE. 
This provision of this rule, making charges for computer software maintenance taxable 
(R865-19S-92(B)), is in harmony with § 59-l2-103(l)(g). South Cent._Utah Tel. Ass'n v. 
retneve°_m=59a8b9586fd2c2d39969365c5ed5fE57&_fmtstr=FULL&_docnum=l&_staitd 9'29/l 999 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^. 
CONSTRUCTION WITH STATUTES. 
Rule R865-19S-79, promulgated by the tax commission, was beyond the scope of the 
commission's power and invalid, because it added other criteria to the statute determining 
taxability, extending the reach of the transient room tax and sales tax beyond what a narrow 
reading of the statute would allow. Airport Hilton Ventures. Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 976 
Pt2d U97 (Utah 1999). 
CONSUMER. 
A contractor who has not purchased materials cannot be an ultimate consumer of the 
materials and therefore cannot be liable for sales and use tax. The key in identifying the final 
consumer is ownership. Therefore, using the Tax Commission's own criteria for identifying an 
exempt sale, a high school contracting for construction work was the actual and constructive 
purchaser of the construction materials because it (1) directly issued purchase orders for 
materials, (2) issued checks for materials directly to vendors, (3) took title in its own name, 
(4) inspected and stored the materials on its own property, (5) insured those materials, (6) 
assured that associated warranties ran to itself, (7) exercised direct supervision, and (8) 
explicitly reserved in its contract with the contractor the right to purchase and donate any 
materials to the project that it chose. (Former R865-19-58S.) Thorup Bros. Constr. v. 
Auditing Div, of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 324 (Utah 1993V 
Although a contract specified that the plaintiff never held title to construction materials, 
where he issued purchase orders for the transactions, received invoices from vendors, issued 
checks to pay for the materials, and was required under the terms of the contract to insure 
the materials, the indicia of sale were sufficient to support a finding that he was the final 
consumer of the materials before they were incorporated into real property. Yearoin. Inc. v. 
Tax_ Comm'n. 977 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1999V 
EQUIPMENT. 
These rules expressly excluded real property and improvements to real property from the 
definition of equipment, as that term was used in § 59-12-104. Therefore, the building shells 
of manufacturing facilities were not equipment and were subject to tax. (Former R865-19-
85S.) Morton IntVInc.v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991). 
FINANCING FOR IMPROVEMENTS. 
A lease agreement, prior to the sale of an improvement to real estate, does not change the 
nature of the improvement so that it becomes taxable as a sale of tangible personal property 
under § 59-12-103. The rationale for not taxing the sale of improvements to real estate 
under these rules is based on the policy of taxing the final consumer of the personal property, 
the one who converts the personal property into real property. These rules suggest that 
determination of a tax assessment should be based on the physical process of conversion, not 
on how the conversion is financed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 843 P.2d 525 (Utan Ct. App. 1992). 
INFORMATION. 
The lease or sale of knowledge, information, or data such as mailing lists was taxable as a 
personal property transaction when the information was conveyed by a tangible medium such 
as printed sheets and magnetic tapes. (Former R865-19-26S.) Mark 0. Haroldsen, Inc_\L 
State Tax ComnrVn, 805_P.2d 176 (Utah 1990). 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
The Commission properly levied sales tax on sales by a wholesale construction supply store 
(the taxpayer) to out-of-state customers of goods that were delivered to those customers by 
the store's agents or were picked up by the customers at the taxpayer's place of business, 
when the taxpayer failed to keep adequate records with regard to its sales and was unable to 
produce the necessary exemption certificates. (Former R865-235.) TummurruTrades,. Inc. v. 
Tetrieve?jn«59a8b9586fd2c2d39969365c5ed5^ 9/29/1999 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 19901. 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION. 
- NEW OR EXPANDING OPERATIONS. 
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from pnor activities" (R865-19S-85) is inconsistent with § 59-12-104 
and improperly restricts the availability of sales tax exemptions to new products or services 
Newspaper Agency Com, v. Utah Sfete Tax Comm'n. 892 P.2d 17 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1995), cert. 
granted, 910 P.2d 425 fUtah 1995V 
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "begun in a new physical plant 
location in Utah" (R865-19S-85) is contrary to § 59-12-104 and impermissibly limits the 
availability of the sales tax exemption. Newspaper Agency Core, v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 
892P.2d 17 (Utah Ct. APD. 19Q5V cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995V 
A sale will be exempt if it qualifies under one of the subparts of R865-19S-85(A)(3) even if 
it fails under the other two subparts. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 906 P.2d 8B2 fUtah 1QQSV 
R865-19S-85(A)(3)(a) reasonably defines "new operations" and is therefore valid. Eaton 
Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951. 
R865-19S-8S(A)(3)(c) reasonably defines "expanding operations" as manufacturing 
activities that "increase production or capacity" and properly excludes taxable "normal 
operating replacements," a term taken directly from § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951. 
- NORMAL OPERATING REPLACEMENTS. 
R865-19S-85(A)(6) properly limits "normal operating replacements" to machinery and 
equipment that replace existing machinery and equipment of a "similar nature"; 
replacements that are not of a "similar nature" are not "normal operating" replacements and 
thus are eligible for the exemption provided in § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951. 
The language of both § 59-12-104(16) and R865-19S-85 confirms that the normal 
operating replacements limitation applies to both new and expanding operations; therefore, 
because the Commission reasonably found that petitioner's printing presses were "normal 
operating replacements" and because the normal operating replacements limitation applies to 
both new and expanding operations, petitioner was not entitled to an exemption under § 59-
12-104(16). Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1997). 
- REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING MACHINERY. 
Even though new machine clearly increased company's production and capacity, the 
commission correctly found that the machine replaced "existing machinery or equipment of a 
similar nature" under R865-19S-85. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div, of Utah State Tax 
Comm n, 906 P.2d 882JUtah 1995) 
The Supreme Court, applying Eaton Kenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 906 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 
1995y, which stated that "modernizing and upgrading machinery and equipment are normally 
done in the regular course of business, even though the replaced items may be in good 
working order/' and reversing the appellate court's decision, held that this rule is "reasonable 
and fairly defines "normal operating replacements'" and valid. Newspaper_Agency Cgrp j^/^  
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm n, 938 P.2d 266_£Utah_l§2ZX. 
MANUFACTURER. 
The Tax Commision's rule defining "manufacturer" was invalid because it improperly 
restricted the manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in § 59-12-104(16). (Former 
R865-85S-1.) Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm^J46_P^2d 
1304 (Utah 1993J. 
MINING. 
Company owning and operating a phosphate mine which transported ore to its fertilizer 
plant via a pipeline owned and operated by a separately incorporated common carrier was 
liable for the sales tax on electricity furnished by the company to the carrier. SF_Phospnates 
Ltd. Co. v. Auditing Div.. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 972 P.2d 384 (Utah 19981. 
PASSAGE OF TITLE. 
These rules codified the requirements for determining when title passes and adopted the 
passage-of-title test for fixing the moment for determining the tax. Therefore, because 
taxpayer did not pass title until delivery, he was obligated to collect and remit sales tax on 
his transportation charges. (Former R865-19-71S.) Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div., 
842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992V 
REPAIR OR RENOVATIONS. 
These rules did not support taxing, drilling and milling services on logs a railroad company 
had previously purchased. The commission's view that drilling and milling are equivalent to 
repair or renovation is unsupportabie; repair and renovation suggest activities that "fix" an 
already manufactured product. The authority to tax services performed on items owned by 
the taxpayer is not coextensive with the authority to tax based on services performed pnor to 
sale. (Former R865-19-51S.) union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992V 
RESIDENT. 
The Utah State Tax Commission has clearly defined the term bona fide nonresident for 
purposes of the sales tax exemption. Although the commission's regulation included an 
expanded definition of the term "resident" for sales tax purposes beyond the general common 
law definition of resident, this is consistent with the well established principle that state tax 
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption. 
(Former R873-22-1M.) Putvm v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. ADD. 1992^. 
WARRANTY AGREEMENTS. 
The provision of this rule which taxes the purchase of extended warranty agreements 
(R865-19S-78(H)) is in harmony with § 59-12-103(l)(g). South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v. 
Auditing Diy.^JLUtaiLStateJTax Comm'n, 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^. 
CITED. 
For cases citing this rule or similar former rules, see BJ.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n. 
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992): Heritage Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953 P.2d 
445 (Utah 1997J. 
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TAX COMMISSION 
R865. AUDITING. 
R865-19S. SALES AND USE TAX. 
U.A.C R865-19S-33 (1999) 
R865-19S-33. Admissions and User Fees Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-12-102 
and 59-12-103. 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a place. Admission includes the 
amount paid for the right to use a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theater, circus, 
stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type of entertainment. 
Admission also includes the right to use a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether 
such charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any such similar charge. 
1. This applies whether the charge made for the use of the seat, table, or similar 
accommodation is combined with an admission charge to form a single charge, or is separate 
and distinct from an admission charge, or is the sole charge. 
B. "Annual membership dues paid to a private organization" includes only those dues paid by 
members who, directly or indirectly, establish the level of the dues. 
C. "Season passes" include amounts paid to participate in specific activities, once annual 
membership dues have been paid. 
D. If the original admission charge carries the right to remain in a place, or to use a seat or 
table, or other similar accommodation for a limited time only, and an additional charge is 
made for an extension of such time, the extra charge is paid for admission within the 
meaning of the law. Where a person or organization acquires the sole right to use any place 
or the right to dispose of all of the admissions to any place for one or more occasions, the 
amount paid is not subject to the tax on admissions. Such a transaction constitutes a rental 
of the entire place and if the person or organization in turn sells admissions, sales tax applies 
to amounts paid for such admissions 
E. Annual membership dues may be paid in installments during the year. 
F. Amounts paid for the following activities are not admissions or user fees: 
1. lessons, public or private; 
2. sign up for amateur athletics if the activity is sponsored by a state governmental entity, or 
a nonprofit corporation or organization, the primary purpose of which, as stated in the 
corporations or organization s articles or bylaws, is the sponsoring, promoting, and 
retrieve0 m=91Ge722e549a2addlc9c6a6798d9516& fmtstF=FULL& docnum=l& 
encouraging of amateur athletics; 
3. sign up for participation in school activities. Sign up for participation in school activities 
excludes attendance as a spectator at school activities. 
G. If amounts charged for activities listed in F. are billed along with admissions or user fees, 
the amounts not subject to the sales tax must be listed separately on the invoice in order to 
remain untaxed. 
AUTHORITY: 
Utah Code Section 10-1-303, 10-1-306, 26-32a-101 through 26-32a-113, 59-1-210. 59-12 
HISTORY: 9819, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9820, AMD, 03/1 7/89; 9952, AMD, 06/02/89; 10232, 
AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10233, AMD, 1 1/24/89; 10234, AMD, see CPR; 10234, CPR, 03/05/90; 
10395, AMD, 03/01/90; 10399, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10400, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10401, NSC, 12/2 
7/89; 10402, NSC, 12/2 7/89; 10679, AMD, 07/12/90; 10680, AMD, 07/12/90; 10681, AMD, 
07/12/90; 10682, AMD, 07/12/90; 10731, AMD, 08/03/90; 10732, AMD, 08/03/90; 10733, 
AMD, see CPR; 10733, CPR, 10/15/90; 10734, NSC, 07/11/90; 10736, AMD, see CPR; 
10736, CPR, 10/15/90; 10900, NSC, 07/11/90; 10901, NSC, 07/11/90; 10902, NSC, 
07/11/90; 10904 to 10911, NSC, 07/11/90; 10917, AMD, see CPR; 10917, CPR, 12/01/90; 
10983, NSC, 07/25/90; 10984, NSC, 07/25/90; 11015, NSC, 08/20/90; 11087, AMD, 
11/02/90; 11098, AMD, 12/13/90; 11099, AMD, 1 1/20/90; 11159, NSC, 10/01/90; 11215, 
AMD, 0 1/28/91; 11216, AMD, 0 1/28/91; 11217, AMD, 01/07/91; 11218, AMD, 01/07/91; 
11219, AMD, 12/13/90; 11456, NSC, 02/15/91; 11457, NSC, 02/15/91; 11534, NSC, 
02/15/91; 11535, NSC, 02/15/91; 11560, NSC, 02/15/91; 11561, NSC, 02/15/91; 11636, 
AMD, 05/28/91; 11649, AMD, see CPR; 11649, CPR, 09/05/91; 11657, AMD, 07/01/91; 
11658, AMD, 07/01/91; 11845, AMD, 09/04/91; 11972, NSC, 08/15/91; 11973, NSC, 
08/15/91; 12853, AMD, 08/18/92; 12854, AMD, 07/15/92; 13187, AMD, 09/29/92; 13348, 
NSC, 10/01/92; 13498, NSC, 11/01/92; 13781, AMD, see CPR; 13781, CPR, 04/14/93; 
13949, AMD, 0 1/27/93; 14069, AMD, 02/16/93; 14257, NSC, 03/31/93; 14320, AMD, 
05/17/93; 14413, AMD, see CPR; 14413, CPR, 08/02/93; 14500, AMD, 07/01/93; 14600, 
AMD, 09/02/93; 14601, AMD, 09/02/93; 14602, AMD, 09/02/93; 14657, AMD, 09/02/93; 
14893, NSC, 10/01/93; 14993, NSC, 11/01/93; 15369, AMD, 03/14/94; 15621, AMD, 
04/07/94; 15757, NSC, 05/01/94; 15804, AMD, 06/24/94; 15805, AMD, 06/24/94; 15806, 
AMD, 06/24/94; 15849, AMD, 08/23/94; 15850, AMD, 07/19/94; 16062, AMD, 09/21/94; 
16185, NSC, 10/01/94; 16186, NSC, 10/01/94; 16187, NSC, 10/01/94; 16273, NSC, 
11/01/94; 16388, AMD, 02/13/95; 16869, NSC, 06/01/95; 16870, AMD, 07/06/95; 16871, 
AMD, 07/06/95; 16900, AMD, 07/06/95; 16901, AMD, 07/06/95; 17010, AMD, 08/15/95; 
17060, AMD, 08/15/95; 17190, AMD, 10/24/95; 17009, AMD, see CPR; 17009, CPR, 
12/19/95; 17285, AMD, 01/01/96; 17561, AMD, 04/23/96; 17562, AMD, 04/23/96; 17563, 
AMD, see CPR; 17563, CPR, 05/29/96; 17654, NSC, 04/30/96; 17743, AMD, 07/25/96; 
17744, AMD, 07/25/96; 17862, AMD, 08/20/96; 17863, AMD, 08/20/96; 17889, NSC, 
09/30/96; 17910, AMD, 09/24/96; 17970, AMD, 09/24/96; 18021, NSC, 09/30/96; 18062, 
AMD, 10/22/96; 18064, AMD. 10/22/96; 18065, AMD, 10/22/96; 18066, AMD, 10/22/96; 
18067, AMD, 10/22/96; 18068, AMD, 10/22/96; 18059, NSC, 10/31/96; 18163, NSC, 1 
1/30/96; 18229, AMD, 12/20/96; 18278, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18279, AMD, 0 1/28/97; 18336, 
AMD, see CPR; 18336, CPR. 03/21/97. 18403, AMD, 03/21/97; 18404, AMD, 03/21/97; 
18588, AMD, 03/21/97; 18725, NSC. 04/28/97, 18201, NSC, 04/30/97; 19280, 5YR, 
05/22/97; 19251, NSC, 06/06/97; 19245. AMD, 07/03/97; 19406, AMD, 08/21/97; 19407, 
AMD, 08/21/97; 19408, AMD, 08/21/97; 19409, AMD, 08/21/97; 19410, AMD, 08/21/97; 
19422, AMD, 08/21/97; 19442, AMD. 08/21/97; 19750, NSC, 11/01/97; 19931, AMD, 
11/05/97; 19932, AMD, 11/05/97; 20828, AMD, 05/04/98; 21195, AMD, 08/11/98; 21220, 
AMD, 08/11/98; 21323, AMD, 10/14/98. 
NOTES: 
NOTES CONSTRUING PORTIONS OF THIS RULE OR FORMER, SIMILAR RULE 
ADMISSION. 
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"Admission" is defined in terms of the right to enter a place and not in terms of a fee 
charged to use facilities or equipment within a place; the definition merely incorporates the 
plain and settled meaning of "admission." Therefore, the Tax-Commission's decision that an 
indoor entertainment mall was liable for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating, 
batting cages, and laser tag was incorrect since these were only fees charged to do particular 
things. (Former R865-19-33S.) 49th Street Gallena v. Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct. 
ADD. 1993). cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
APPLICATION. 
Seller of modular units to dealers before the units were permanently attached sold tangible 
personal property, not improvements to real estate or completed homes. Therefore, seller 
owed sales tax pursuant to his statutory duty to collect and remit taxes. (Former R865-58S-
1.) Valaardson Hous. Svs. v. State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 618 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
859 P.2d 585 (Utah 19931. 
This rule applies to the resale of an item traded in as part of a purchase price, but not 
subsequent use other than a resale. (Former R865-19-72S.) Knowledge Data Svs. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 865 P.2d 1387 (Utah Ct. ADD. 19931. 
Because sales tax is not levied on real property transfers, a real property contractor, a 
contractor who purchases materials and incorporates those materials Into real property 
improvements, is considered the ultimate consumer of the property for purposes of imposing 
a sales tax. Therefore, although taxpayer entered into a joint venture agreement in which co-
venturer was responsible for installation, taxpayer remained the real property contractor as 
he was ultimately responsible for installation and consequently he remained liable for the 
taxes assessed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax 
Comm^_8_5_8_P.2d 1Q34 (Utah Ct. Apj. 1993), cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994^. 
COMPUTER SERVICES. 
- PRIMARY OBJECT OF SALE. 
When manufacturing company provided computer company engineering drawings to be 
scanned and converted into a computer-readable form, the transaction was primarily a 
service, not a new taxable purchase of tangible personal property that the customer did not 
previously own. EatoiLKenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 
(Utah 1995). 
- SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE. 
This provision of this rule, making charges for computer software maintenance taxable 
(R865-19S-92(B)), is in harmony with § 59-12-103(l) (g) . South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 951_Ps2d 218 (Utah 19971. 
CONSTRUCTION WITH STATUTES. 
Rule R865-19S-79, promulgated by the tax commission, was beyond the scope of the 
commissions power and invalid, because it added other criteria to the statute determining 
taxability, extending the reach of the transient room tax and sales tax beyond what a narrow 
reading of the statute would allow. Airport Hilton Ventures. Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n. 976 
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1999). 
CONSUMER. 
A contractor who has not purchased materials cannot be an ultimate consumer of the 
materials and therefore cannot be liable for sales and use tax. The key in identifying the final 
consumer is ownership. Therefore, using the Tax Commission's own criteria for identifying an 
exempt sale, a high school contracting for construction work was the actual and constructive 
purchaser of the construction materials because it (1) directly issued purchase orders for 
materials, (2) issued checks for materials directly to vendors, (3) took title in its own name, 
(4) inspected and stored the materials on its own property, (5) insured those materials, (6) 
assured that associated warranties ran to itself, (7) exercised direct supervision, and (8) 
explicitly reserved in its contract with the contractor the right to purchase and donate any 
materials to the project that it chose. (Former R865-19-58S.) ThomjLBxos^CaiistrjA 
... retrieve?_m~91 Oe722e549a2add 1 c9c6a6798d9516& Jmtstr=FULL&_docnum= 1 &_startd 9/27/1999 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 860 P.2d 324 fUtah 1992V 
Although a contract specified that the plaintiff never held title to construction materials, 
where he issued purchase orders for the transactions, received invoices from venaors, issued 
checks to pay for the materials, and was required under the terms of the contract to insure 
the materials, the indicia of sale were sufficient to support a finding that he was tne final 
consumer of the materials before they were incorporated into real property. Yeargtn. Inc. v. 
Tax Comm'n. 977 P.2d 527 fUtah Ct. ADD. 1999V 
EQUIPMENT. 
These rules expressly excluded real property and improvements to real property from the 
definition of equipment, as that term was used in § 59-12-104. Therefore, the building shells 
of manufacturing facilities were not equipment and were subject to tax. (Former R865-19-
85S.) Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
X3SXU 
FINANCING FOR IMPROVEMENTS. 
A lease agreement, prior to the sale of an improvement to real estate, does not change the 
nature of the improvement so that it becomes taxable as a sale of tangible personal property 
under § 59-12-103. The rationale for not taxing the sale of improvements to real estate 
under these rules is based on the policy of taxing the final consumer of the personal property, 
the one who converts the personal property into real property. These rules suggest that 
determination of a tax assessment should be based on the physical process of conversion, not 
on how the conversion is financed. (Former R865-19-58S.) Superior Soft Water Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, $43 PT2d 525JUJ»h Ct. APP, 1992), 
INFORMATION. 
The iease or sale of knowledge, information, or data such as mailing lists was taxable as a 
personal property transaction when the information was conveyed by a tangible medium such 
as printed sheets and magnetic tapes. (Former R865-19-26S.) Mark O. Haroldsen. Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 80S P.2d 176 (Utah 1990^. 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
The Commission property levied sales tax on sales by a wholesale construction supply store 
(the taxpayer) to out-of-state customers of goods that were delivered to those customers by 
the stores agents or were picked up by the customers at the taxpayer's place of business, 
when the taxpayer failed to keep adequate records with regard to its sales and was unable to 
produce the necessary exemption certificates. (Former R865-23S.) Tummurru Trades. Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). 
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT EXEMPTION. 
- NEW OR EXPANDING OPERATIONS. 
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "substantially different in nature, 
character, or purpose from prior activities" (R865-19S-85) is inconsistent with § 59-12-104 
and improperly restricts the availability of sales tax exemptions to new products or services. 
Newspaper Agency .Corp. v Utah State Tax Comm'n
 t331±2iAllUt»hJ^J!fiP^X9S51j cert, 
granted, 910 P.2d 425_(Utan 1995). 
The provision of this rule defining "new or expanding operations" to require that 
manufacturing, processing, or assembling activities must be "begun in a new physical plant 
location in Utah" (R865-19S-85) is contrary to § 59-12-104 and impermissibly limits the 
availability of the sales tax exemption. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
892_P.2d 17 (Utah_Ct._App. 1995), cert, granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 19951. 
A sale will be exempt if it aualifies under one of the subparts of R865-19S-85(A)(3) even if 
it fails under the other two subparts. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. A i d i n g Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n,.906 P,_2d_88iIiJLtah 1995). 
R865-19S-85(A)(3)(a) reasonably defines "new operations" and is therefore valid. Eaton 
Kenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah_lSSSL 
retneve?_m-91 f2e722e549a2add 1 c9c6a6798d9516&_fmtsti^FULL£_docnum= 1 &_startd 9/27/1999 
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R865-19S-85(A)(3)(c) reasonably defines "expanding operations" as manufacturing 
activities that "increase production or capacity" and properly excludes taxable "normal 
operating replacements/' a term taken directly from § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenway, Inc. v 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951. 
- NORMAL OPERATING REPLACEMENTS. 
R865-19S-85(A)(6) properly limits "normal operating replacements" to machinery and 
equipment that replace existing machinery and equipment of a "similar nature"; 
replacements that are not of a "similar nature" are not "normal operating" replacements and 
thus are eligible for the exemption provided in § 59-12-104(15). Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 (Utah 19951. 
The language of both § 59-12-104(16) and R865-19S-85 confirms that the normal 
operating replacements limitation applies to both new and expanding operations; therefore, 
because the Commission reasonably found that petitioner's printing presses were "normal 
operating replacements" and because the normal operating replacements limitation applies to 
both new and expanding operations, petitioner was not entitled to an exemption under § 59-
12-104(16). Newspaper Agency Com, v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d 
2$$ fUtth I997)r 
- REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING MACHINERY. 
Even though new machine clearly increased company's production and capacity, the 
commission correctly found that the machine replaced "existing machinery or equipment of a 
similar nature" under R865-19S-85. Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 906 P.2d 882 fUtah 1995V 
The Supreme Court, applying Eaton Kenwav. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 906 P.2d 882. 887 (Utah 
1995), which stated that "modernizing and upgrading machinery and equipment are normally 
done in the regular course of business, even though the replaced items may be in good 
working order," and reversing the appellate court's decision, held that this rule is "reasonable 
and fairly defines "normal operating replacements'" and valid. Newspaper Agency Corp. v. 
Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997V 
MANUFACTURER. 
The Tax Commision's rule defining "manufacturer" was invalid because it improperly 
restricted the manufacturing sales tax exemption set forth in § 59-12-104(16). (Former 
R865-85S-1.) Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 
1304_(Utah 1993). 
MINING. 
Company owning and operating a phosphate mine which transported ore to its fertilizer 
plant via a pipeline owned and operated by a separately incorporated common earner was 
liable for the sales tax on electricity furnished by the company to the carrier. SF Phosphates 
Ltd. Co. v. Auditmg.Diy., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 972 P.2d 384 (Utah 1998). 
PASSAGE OF TITLE. 
These rules codified the requirements for determining when title passes and adopted the 
passage-of-title test for fixing the moment for determining the tax. Therefore, because 
taxpayer did not pass title until delivery, he was obligated to collect and remit sales tax on 
his transportation charges. (Former R865-19-71S.) Hales Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Audit Div.. 
842 P.2d 887JUtah_1992). 
REPAIR OR RENOVATIONS. 
These rules did not support taxing, drilling and milling services on logs a railroad company 
had previously purchased. The commission's view that drilling and milling are equivalent to 
repair or renovation is unsupportable; repair and renovation suggest activities that "fix" an 
already manufactured product. The authority to tax services performed on items owned by 
the taxpayer is not coextensive with the authority to tax based on services performed prior to 
sale. (Former R865-19-51S.) Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
'retneve°_m=91 £2e722e549a2add 1 c9c6a6798d9516&Jmtstr=FULL&_docnum=l &_startd 9/27/1999 
RESIDENT. 
The Utah State Tax Commission has clearly defined the term bona fide nonresident for 
purposes of the sales tax exemption. Although the commission's regulation included an 
expanded definition of the term "resident" for sales tax purposes beyond the general common 
law definition of resident, this is consistent with the well established principle that state tax 
exemption statutes are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the exemption. 
(Former R873-22-1M.) Putvm v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 837 P.2d 589 (Utah Ct. ADD. 19921. 
WARRANTY AGREEMENTS. 
The provision of this rule which taxes the purchase of extended warranty agreements 
(R865-19S-78(H)) is in harmony with § 59-12-103(l)(g). South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v. 
Auditing Dlv. of Utah State Tax Comm'n. 951 P.2d 218 (Utah 1997^ 
CITED. 
For cases citing this rule or similar former rules, see BJ.-Titan Servs. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992): Heritage Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 953 P.2d 
445 (Utah 1997), 
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Shall the Utah Constitution be amended to permit I 
Legislature to authorize any state court to adjudica 
review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decid 
by the State Tax Commission or by any county boz 
of equalization relating to revenue and taxatic 
including authorization for application back to July 
1994 under specified circumstances? 
RESOLUTION ON REVIEW OF TAX 
COMMISSION CASES 
Votes cast by the members of the Legislature at the 1998 General Session on final passage: 
HOUSE (75 members): Yeas, 66; Nays, 0; Absent, 9. 
SENATE (29 members): Yeas, 2S; Nays, 0; Absent, 1. 
Impartial Analysis 
Proposition 6 amends the Revenue and Taxation Article of the 
Utah Constitution. It permits the Legislature to authorize any state 
court to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter 
decided by the State Tax Commission or by a county board of 
equalization relating to revenue and-taxation. This proposition 
also permits the legislature to make the expansion of the caurt'jf 
jurisdiction effective back to July 1, 1994 under specified 
circumstances, 
Current Jaw 
The Utah Constitution presently directs the State Tax 
Com mission to "administer and supervise the tax laws of the State*' 
and specifies other powers of the Commission. Under current state 
statute, a district court may affirm or reverse a State Tax 
Commission decision or send it back to the Commission for its 
fu rr her action. The district court may also grant other relief as long 
as the court's actions do not limit State Tax Commission powers set 
forth in the Utah Constitution. According to a recent Utah court 
decision, the Utah Constitution does not presently allow the 
Legislature to authorize a district court to conduct an original, 
independent proceeding on a State Tax Commission decision. 
The Utah Constitution also directs county boards, of 
equalization to adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of 
property within their respective counties, subject to regulation and 
control by the State Tax Commission as provided by statute. Under 
current state statute, a county board of equalization decision may 
be appealed to the Utah Supreme Court after review by the Sta 
Tax Commission. 
Proposed changes 
Proposition 6 amends the Utah Constitution to allow tl 
Legislature to authorize a state court to adjudicate, reviev 
reconsider, or redetermine a. matter decided by the State Ta 
Commission or by a county board of equalization relating I 
revenue and taxation. This proposition allows the Legislature t 
expand the jurisdiction of state courts with respect to decisions c 
the State Tax Commission and county boards of equaiizatior 
Under that expanded jurisdiction, a court could conduct ai 
original, independent proceeding and exercise its own judgment i: 
the place of a decision by the State Tax Commission or a decisioi 
by a county board of equalization that has received review by thi 
State Tax Commission. This proposition also allows the 
Legislature to authorize a state court to review directly a count) 
board of equalization decision that has not received State Taa 
Commission review. 
In addition, Proposition 6 gives the Legislature authority tc 
make the expansion of the court's jurisdiction effective back to 
July 1,1994. This retroactive application would apply to decisions 
of the State Tax Commission or county boards of equalization for 
which neither a district court, the Court of Appeals, nor the 
38 
^ ^ B m e Court has issued a final, unappealable judgment or order, 
BBFas long as n vested right is nol enlarged, eliminated, or 
Pesfroycd. 
Statutory provisions effective on passage of Proposition 6 
If Proposition 6 passes, certain provisions of S.B, 62, District 
Court Review of Tax Commission Cases, 1998 General vSession, 
will become law on January 1,1999. (Other provisions of S.B. 62 
have a!rcj\dy become law.) The provisions of S.I3. 62 that become 
law upon passage of Proposition 6: 1) grant a district court 
jurisdiction lo conduct an original, independent proceeding in 
reviewing a final decision issued by the State Tax Commission if 
the decision resulted from a formal, administrative proceeding; 2) 
expressly grant a district court the power to modify any order 
issued by the Stale Tax Commission; and 3) remove language that 
restricts the dislricl court's ability to grant other relief in reviewing. 
Stale Tax Commission decisions. These statutory provisions are 
applied back to July I, J 994 for decisions relating to revenue and 
taxation that arc issued by the Slate Tax Commission or county 
boards of equalization. This retroactive application applies lo 
decisions for which neither a district court, the Court of Appeals* 
nor the Supreme Court has issued a final, unappealable judgment 
or order and for which application back does nol "enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy a vested right." 
S,B, 62 does nol expand state court jurisdiction to review ..-
directly a county board of equalization decision that has not 
received State Tax Commission review, although Proposition 6 
authorizes the Legislature lo do so. 
EfTcctive Date
 V.„_T-. ' 
Proposition 6 IhJc'eS Effect on January 1, 1999 and authorizes 
the legislature to pass laws applying the provisions of Proposition 
6 back to July 1, 1994 under specified circumstances. 
Fiscal Note 
'The State Tax Commission bus identified 31 tax cases 
currently pending before Utah stale courts that will be impacted if 
Proposition 6 passes. These 31 cases arc already being reviewed by 
Utah state courts under current statutes but would be eligible for 
review by a state court in an original, independent proceeding if 
Proposition 6 passes. The result of an original, independent court 
proceeding, in terms of the amount or tax owed by a taxpnycr 
involved in a case, may or may nol differ from the result that 
would have been reached without die original, independent court 
proceeding. 
Additionally, the Slate Tax Commission expressed concern that a 
broad reading of S.B. 62 would allow court review for any 
Commission decision issued since July I„ 1994 that has not received 
final, unappealable court action. The potential fiscal impact of such 
a reading is uncertain. 
39 
Arguments For 
A vote for Proposition 6 will help ensure fair and 
equitable taxation in Utah by re-establishing a tax court in the 
state and providing a more taxpayer-favorable place to appeal 
tax assessments. 
Assume for a minute that you or your company have been 
hit with a sales or income tax audit that you believe is unfair. 
Or assume that your property value for property tax purposes 
doubles in one year's time and you want to appeal. Under 
Utah's current tax appeal structure, the "judges" in your appeal 
are the very people that imposed the tax on you—either the 
county, or the state tax commission. Moreover, if you appeal 
the decision of these taxing authorities to court, the appellate 
court is required to defer to the judgment of those government 
authorities on most issues, giving these government 
authorities the benefit of any doubts. 
In 1998, the Legislature voted 94-0 to allow you to take 
your Tax Commission assessment for an impartial day in 
court Approval of this Proposition will make the tax court a 
reality, The tax judges will be able to hear all evidence in a 
case, and make a ruling based solely on the facts and law, 
without paying undo deference to the tax assessing body. The 
tax cou rt will consist of 6 sitting district court judges who have 
tax expertise. Because the judges are already sitting judges, 
the court will cost the taxpayers of Utah no additional money. 
The judges will continue to hear non-tax cases. To be more 
accessible to taxpayers, these judges will travel to any areas of 
the state where tax disputes arise. 
The Tax Commission does a good job with its duties* 
However, isn't it comforting to know that someone 
unconnected to the assessing function can review your case. 
The United Stares was founded on the principle of checks and 
balances, with different branches of government making sure 
other branches act appropriately to ensure fairness for all. The 
tax court is a check and balance for Utah's tax system, 
providing an impartial eye to ensure the system runs smoothly 
and fairly for everybody. 
Senator Howard A, Stephenson 
Representative John Valentine 
Rebuttal To 
'Arguments For Proposition No. 6 
(No opposing argument was submitted.) 
Arguments Against 
(No argument was submitted.) 
Rebuttal To 
Arguments Against Proposition No. 6 
(No opposing argument was submitted.) 
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